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ABSTRACT
For the last decade, the European Union (EU) has been
reconceptualizing its corporate restructuring framework with the
hope of bolstering capital markets and improving cross-border
lending. Unfortunately, the system remains plagued by two
intractable problems: divergent substantive law at the Member
State level and jurists unaccustomed to guiding reorganization
cases. The result is a system beset by uncertainty and disparate
treatment. The EU is intent on addressing these problems, but
progress has been elusive.
The EU must work through
recommendations and directives to encourage Member States to
align substantive restructuring law with policy design. But Member
States have been unresponsive to the EU’s recent efforts. The
prospect of addressing these intractable problems in the foreseeable
future is grim. Therefore, this Article breaks with current
scholarship and urges the EU to adopt a radical alternative. The EU
should consider making legal and structural changes that will
facilitate bankruptcy tourism. I argue that affording corporations
increased discretion as to the location of restructuring cases will aid
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in creating judicial hubs of optimal law and experienced jurists. The
EU has the power to adopt my recommendations by simply
modifying its own law and procedure, which should accelerate
implementation timelines.
Ultimately, a global financial correction is underway. The EU’s
restructuring framework is unprepared to offer predictable and
comprehensive reorganization outcomes for the new wave of
distressed corporations. This Article proposes a novel vantage point
from which to assess policy alignment.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1990, Frank Lorenzo—chairman of Continental Airlines—sat
in his opulent Houston office and fumed. The crisis in the Persian
Gulf had caused oil prices to spike, squeezing Continental’s margins
and crippling the company’s ability to service its $2.2 billion debt
burden.1 Lenders were unwilling to renegotiate the debt.2 Lorenzo
needed massive concessions from the company’s labor unions, but
he had a vitriolic relationship with his employees.3 Labor unions
regarded him as pure evil. 4 The prospect of an amicable
compromise was abysmal.
A bankruptcy filing was Continental’s only option. At that time,
few large corporations viewed bankruptcy as a way to rehabilitate a
struggling business. Rather, bankruptcy was seen as an act of
suicide, with the bankruptcy court tasked with conducting the postmortem and disposing of the body. But Lorenzo had taken
Continental Airlines through bankruptcy in the early 1980s and
understood that the process offered the possibility of meaningful
value preservation and debt alleviation.5
Unfortunately, there was another problem to consider. At that
time, troubled businesses invariably filed their bankruptcy cases in
the city in which their home office was located. Indeed, the first
Continental bankruptcy case had been filed in Houston.6 Lorenzo
was troubled by the prospect of the second bankruptcy case landing
Judge Wheless had overseen the first Continental
there. 7
bankruptcy case and ruled in the debtor’s favor in ostensibly every
significant matter. 8 However, after the company emerged from
bankruptcy, Judge Wheless presided over the personal bankruptcy

1

at A1.

See Agis Salpukas, Continental Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1990,

2 See THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., HARD LANDING: THE EPIC CONTEST FOR POWER AND
PROFITS THAT PLUNGED THE AIRLINES INTO CHAOS 214 (1995).
3 Id. at 216-19.
4
See Cindy Skrzycki, For Frank Lorenzo, Controversy is Business as Usual, WASH.
POST, March 9, 1989, at A14.
5 See PETZINGER, supra note 2, at 243-44.
6 See LYNN LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE 58 (2005).
7 Id. at 59
8 Id.
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cases of the pilots that had participated in the labor strike against
Continental and whom the company had refused to hire back. 9
After witnessing the devastation from Lorenzo’s personal vendettas,
Judge Wheless had gone so far as to describe Continental as “Attila
the Hun.”10
Frank Lorenzo needed to find a different venue for Continental’s
second bankruptcy case. He understood that the federal bankruptcy
code’s venue provision was woefully ambiguous. The right judge
could construe the provision in a way that would allow Continental
to forum shop.
This type of maneuvering required an
accommodating jurist. Continental found such a jurist in the
Delaware bankruptcy court.11
Judge Helen Balick was the only bankruptcy judge in Delaware
at that time.12 And she had a light caseload. From 1980 to 1989, only
one large publicly held company filed for bankruptcy in Delaware.13
The vast majority of Fortune 500 companies were—and still are—
incorporated in Delaware, but only a few have any meaningful
connection to the state and even less are headquartered there.14 In
1990, the Delaware bankruptcy court lacked the prominence of the
Delaware chancery courts, which adjudicated the most complex
business law disputes in the country. The Continental bankruptcy
case was an opportunity for Judge Balick to redefine how the
corporate bankruptcy market viewed her court. She seized that
opportunity.
Over the course of the case, Judge Balick demonstrated an
unprecedented conviction to fulfill the requests made by the
debtor’s management team. She issued injunctions to stop
Id.
Id.
11
See id. at 60-61. By the time the bankruptcy case was filed, Lorenzo had sold
his controlling ownership interest in Continental but remained on the board of
directors. Id. at 58-59.
12
Ann Davis, Judges Are Added to Bench in Delaware Bankruptcy Court, WALL
ST.
J.
(Feb.
5,
1997,
12:01AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB855096666622716500 [https://perma.cc/TT369BCV].
13
UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RSCH. DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu
[https://perma.cc/PDF6-HP7W].
14
See Delaware Division of Corporations, About the Division of Corporations,
DELAWARE.GOV,
https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency/
[https://perma.cc/V2PY-T2ZT].
9

10
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troublesome litigation in other jurisdictions and forbade attorneys
from appearing in other courts to seek relief against Continental.15
Many of her rulings were devoid of any supporting basis. 16 She
received rebukes from more senior and experienced jurists in other
jurisdictions.17 Judge Balick was not always successful in fulfilling
Continental’s requests, but the underlying premise of her conduct
was clear: she would not allow the Continental case to be
transferred from her court—even though pieces of the first case were
still being litigated in Judge Wheless’ court in Houston—or
countenance any party undermining the restructuring objectives of
Continental’s management.18 Ultimately, Judge Balick staked out
positions adopted by no bankruptcy court before her19 and virtually
all of her actions were decidedly debtor friendly.20
The result was a powerful signal to the bankruptcy bar. The
Continental case became the fountainhead for a new way of
conceptualizing the bankruptcy process and venue. After receiving
only one bankruptcy case involving a large publicly held company
from 1980 to 1989, the Delaware bankruptcy court oversaw fortyone such cases from 1991 to 1996. 21 In just seven years, the
overlooked Delaware bankruptcy court had become the most
prominent bankruptcy court in the country.
In my 2013 article, 22 I employed a unique set of criteria to
determine that forum shopping23 had become ubiquitous in the US
in the years since the second Continental bankruptcy case. From
1991 to 1996, 55% of publicly held companies with approximately

See LOPUCKI, supra note 6, at 60-68.
See id.
17 See id. at 64. The incomparable Judge Easterbrook described Judge Balick’s
actions as “preposterous,” “unfathomable,” and “rogue.” Id.
18 See id. at 60-68.
19 See id. at 65.
20 See id.
21 See id. at 90.
22
See Samir D. Parikh, Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy, 46 U. CONN. L.
REV. 159 (2013).
23
The terms “forum shopping” and “bankruptcy tourism” are synonymous
and will be used interchangeably throughout this Article.
15
16
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$500 million or more in assets (“Megacases”) 24 forum shopped. 25
From 2007 to 2012, 69% of Megacases did so.26 And the practice
became more prevalent. Forty-eight of the eighty-eight Megacases
filed between 1991 and 1996 had forum shopped, but that number
spiked to 110 out of 159 from 2007 to 2012.27 Consequently, between
the two periods, frequency with which Megacases forum shopped
grew at a statistically significant rate (14%) and the absolute number
of Megacases that forum shopped grew at a staggering rate (130%).28
The last thirty years has been a golden age of bankruptcy tourism in
the United States.
The U.S. bankruptcy system is regarded as the preeminent
bankruptcy system in the world due to its ability to secure high
creditor recovery rates, preserve value for stakeholders, and
facilitate successful restructurings of financially viable entities.29 It
is recognized as “the model to which European restructuring laws
should aspire.”30 In fact, the EU has been extremely clear about its
aspirations and the reasons for them. One of the EU’s primary
policy objectives is to strengthen the economy and the single market

24
See Parikh, supra note 22, at 173-81; see also UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RSCH.
DATABASE, supra note 13. This number was initially measured in 1980 and is
adjusted depending on the year the case was filed. For example, a bankruptcy filed
in 2007 would qualify as a Megacase if the debtor(s) had assets with a fair market
value of at least $1.2 billion.
25 See Parikh, supra note 22, at 177.
26 See id.
27
See id.
28
See id. at 178.
29
See generally DOING BUSINESS REPORT, RESOLVING INSOLVENCY 2019,
https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency
[https://perma.cc/2K4W-P8DU]; Gerard McCormack & Wai Yee Wan,
Transplanting Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code Into Singapore’s Restructuring and
Insolvency Laws: Opportunities and Challenges, 19 J. CORP. L. STUD. 69 (2019).
30
GERARD MCCORMACK, ANDREW KEAY, SARAH BROWN & JUDITH DAHLGREEN,
UNIV. OF LEEDS, STUDY ON A NEW APPROACH TO BUSINESS FAILURE AND INSOLVENCY:
COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE MEMBER STATES’ RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND
PRACTICES 219 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 COMMISSION STUDY] (first citing Maria
Brouwer, Reorganization in US and European Bankruptcy Law, 22 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 5
(2006); then citing Alan Tilley, European Restructuring: Clarifying Trans-Atlantic
Misconceptions, 8 J. PRIV. EQUITY (SPECIAL TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ISSUE) 99
(2005); and then citing Christine Pochet, Institutional Complementarities within
Corporate Governance Systems: A Comparative Study of Bankruptcy Rules, 6 J. MGMT &
GOVERNANCE 343 (2002)).
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by stimulating investment to create jobs. 31 Bolstering capital
markets and encouraging cross-border investment is a prerequisite
to this objective. 32 The free flow of capital is one of the EU’s
fundamental principles. 33 But suboptimal restructuring processes
diminish creditor recoveries and inhibit capital flow.34 Divergent
restructuring laws preclude successful restructurings and risk
assessment, which drives up borrowing costs and, in many cases,
restricts access to credit entirely.35 This is the primary reason the EU
has focused on modeling an optimal restructuring framework for
implementation across Member States.36
Unfortunately, as it currently exists, the framework is
undermined by two intractable problems: 1) significant divergence
of substantive restructuring law across Member States that
undermines predictability and promotes disparate treatment; and 2)
lack of restructuring experience in the judiciary that suppresses
efficient and successful restructurings. Scholars have suggested
various means to address these problems, but progress has been
elusive. Indeed, the EU works through recommendations and
directives in order to encourage Member States to make substantive
changes to national law. 37 The EU has repeatedly attempted to
encourage Member States to modify substantive restructuring law
to align with policy objectives, but the urgings have been met with
inaction.38 There is no reason to believe that this intransigence will
abate any time soon.
31 See Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, at 3, COM (2015) 468 final
(Sept. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Capital Markets Action Plan].
32
Id.
33 Id.
34 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Preventive Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and Measures to Increase the
Efficiency of Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge Procedures and Amending
Directive, at 2-3, COM (2016), 723 final (Nov. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Restructuring
Directive].
35 See id.
36
See id. Due to Brexit uncertainty, I have excluded the UK from Member
State discussions and assumed that the English courts will not be a viable
restructuring venue option in upcoming years.
37
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J (C 326) 171-72.
38 See Horst Eidenmüller, Contracting for a European Insolvency Regime 3 (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 341/2017, 2017).
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This Article proposes a novel vantage point from which to view
the EU’s restructuring framework. The EU cannot abide a
protracted timeline for correction. Instead, the EU should consider
a radical alternative: facilitating bankruptcy tourism in order to
afford corporations increased discretion as to the location of
restructuring cases. If implemented, certain Member States will
aggressively modify substantive and procedural restructuring laws
in order to attract Megacases.39 In a new regulatory environment
premised on a forum-shopping model, distressed corporations will
be able to easily access restructuring laws in a variety of Member
States. In some respects, the market of distressed companies will
help select which Member States have optimal substantive law and
procedure. As cases pool in a select group of jurisdictions, judges in
these courts will repeatedly encounter meaningful restructuring
issues and develop a thoughtful approach to key, case-dispositive
issues. Over time, a more predictable restructuring system emerges,
improving creditor recoveries, bolstering capital markets, and
encouraging cross-border lending. The realization of this virtuous
cycle may seem unlikely, but this phenomenon has animated the
U.S. bankruptcy system over the last thirty years.
Part II of this Article explores the EU’s economic policy
objectives and the beneficial effect an efficient and effective
39
Many jurisdictions seek to attract corporate bankruptcy cases in order to
boost local economies and professional industries. See Corinne Ball, Sushma
Jobanputra & Ben Larkin, Singapore Enacts New Corporate Bankruptcy Law in Bid to
Become Center for International Debt Restructuring, JONES DAY (May/June 2017),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2017/05/singapore-enacts-new-corpor
ate-bankruptcy-law-in-bid-to-become-center-for-international-debt-restructuring
[https://perma.cc/HK3U-G359]; see also McCormack & Wan, supra note 29, at 78
(explaining that Singapore’s recent reforms to its restructuring laws are a blatant
attempt to encourage international companies to locate their restructuring cases in
Singapore); NAT’L CONF. OF BANKR. JUDGES, SPECIAL COMM. ON VENUE, REPORT ON
PROPOSAL FOR REVISION OF THE VENUE STATUTE IN COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY CASES 56
(2018)
[hereinafter
VENUE
REPORT],
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.ncbj.org/resource/resmgr/docs_public/Venue_
White_Paper_-_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK3U-G359] (“’Based upon estimates
from Bloomberg Businessweek, the flood of companies fleeing their home
jurisdictions over the past thirteen years has drained nearly $4 billion from local
economies.’” (quoting Venue Fairness: Written Statement on Behalf of National Ad
Hoc Group of Bankruptcy Practitioners in Support of Venue Fairness, Submitted in
Support of Testimony of Douglas B. Rosner Before the American Bankruptcy
Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/22nov2013/Venue-St
atement-ABI-Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/LMD8-YGXV])).
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restructuring system can have in furthering those objectives. This
part also describes the EU’s current legal and regulatory framework
and how this framework aggressively polices bankruptcy tourism.
Part III analyzes the two primary intractable problems embedded in
the EU’s restructuring framework: 1) significant divergence of
substantive restructuring law across Member States that
undermines predictability and promotes disparate treatment; and 2)
lack of restructuring experience in the judiciary that suppresses
efficient and successful restructurings. This part also poses the
question whether the EU can effectively address these problems in
the foreseeable future.
Part IV argues that a radical new approach is necessary in order
to advance the EU’s economic policy objectives. In arguing for a
model premised on the type of controlled tourism prevalent in the
United States, this part describes forum shopping in the United
States and posits that by facilitating tourism, the EU may be able to
address the intractable problems embedded in its restructuring
framework.
In Part V, I explain how tourism can help create judicial hubs,
and this prospect is particularly appealing in the EU. Over time,
tourism supports the development of optimal restructuring laws
and experienced judges located in distinct locales. Countries
wishing to host these hubs may be more inclined to adopt EU
restructuring policy suggestions. If successful, judges in these hubs
will repeatedly encounter meaningful restructuring issues and
develop a thoughtful approach to key, case-dispositive issues.
Predictability allows companies and creditors to formulate a range
of in-court restructuring outcomes with a high degree of certainty.
This data also informs and facilitates out-of-court restructuring
negotiations and improves outcomes.
Experienced judges
accelerate case speed, which increases the likelihood of a successful
restructuring while also lowering process costs. As creditor
recoveries improve, capital markets grow, ultimately reducing
borrowing costs and enhancing cross-border lending.
In Part VI, I delineate my proposed amendments to EU
restructuring law. My primary proposal focuses on a new
conceptualization of a company’s center of main interests (“COMI”)
that better aligns EU venue provisions with U.S. law but with
meaningful distinctions to avoid abuse. I acknowledge that easing
venue regulations increases the risk of abusive or fraudulent
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tourism. Consequently, I further propose procedural changes that
empower courts to better investigate malfeasance that may be the
true motivation for tourism.
There is extensive literature exploring the EU’s restructuring
framework and how to improve it. This Article offers a view of the
cathedral in another light.40 Controlled bankruptcy tourism may be
a necessary lever for addressing intractable framework deficiencies.
By fostering the creation of judicial hubs with optimal restructuring
laws and experienced jurists, tourism would allow the EU to
promptly address legal and structural deficiencies. But in order to
enjoy these benefits, the EU must first revise its restructuring laws
to facilitate tourism. This Article includes multifaceted proposals
designed to encourage the beneficial aspects of bankruptcy tourism
but, at the same time, avoid negative externalities that could
destabilize the restructuring system.
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING
FRAMEWORK
The European Union represents a political and economic
confederation of twenty-seven countries, commonly known as
Member States.41 To those outside of Europe, the EU may appear to
be a type of federal government exerting supremacy, but that is
inaccurate. The EU is pursuing economic objectives that will ideally
create an efficient single market and facilitate the production and

40
In the late 19th century, Claude Monet produced a series of paintings
capturing the front façade of the Rouen Cathedral in Normandy. Each painting
detailed the façade from the same angle but at a different time of day. The variances
in light have a profound impact on the Cathedral’s visage. Monet made over thirty
paintings, and it has been said that one must see all of them to truly understand the
Cathedral. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089-90 n.2
(1972) (citing G. HAMILTON, CLAUDE MONET’S PAINTINGS OF ROUEN CATHEDRAL 4-5,
19-20, 27 (1960)).
41
The 27 Member Countries of the EU, EUROPEAN UNION (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en
[https://perma.cc/N3Ny-YNCE].
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sale of goods and services within that market.42 For example, the
different political and legal institutions that make up the EU (“EU
Institutions”) are not authorized to manage most of the fundamental
matters overseen by the U.S. federal government, including a
military, taxation, social welfare provisions, education, civilian
infrastructure, and human rights.43 EU Institutions do not enjoy the
U.S. federal government’s power to extract revenue through a
comprehensive tax structure. 44 Rather, EU Institutions employ a
variety of direct and indirect mechanisms to facilitate the free
movement of goods, services, capital, workers, and people within a
single market.45
Capital markets integration is a preeminent issue for the EU.46
Capital markets are more efficient—resulting in lower borrowing
costs—when creditor recoveries in corporate distress situations are
predictable. 47 And predictability is based in large part on the
substance and implementation of restructuring laws. However,
unlike the U.S. federal government, EU Institutions cannot
unilaterally mandate changes to substantive restructuring laws. 48
There is no one bankruptcy code for bankruptcy proceedings in the
EU. Member States control the substantive law within their own
country, and the divergence across the region is significant.49 EU
Institutions are resigned to formulating an optimal corporate
restructuring framework and then attempting to incentivize

42 See Andrew Moravcsik, Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Reality,
in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 173 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse ed.
2003).
43 See id. at 166-69 (noting that the task of collective security was arguably
placed in the hands of NATO).
44
See How the EU is Funded, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/about-eu/eu-budget/revenue-income_en [https://;erma.cc/KQ7U-V75B].
The EU’s primary sources of income include agricultural levies, a portion of
national value-added taxation from Member States, and fines imposed when
businesses fail to comply with EU rules. Id.
45
See generally Gabriel Moss, Ian Fletcher & Stuart Isaacs, The EU Regulation
on Insolvency Proceedings (3d ed. 2016).
46 See Capital Markets Action Plan, supra note 31.
47 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 2.
48 See generally MOSS, FLETCHER & ISAACS, supra note 45.
49 See Part III.A., infra.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

218

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:1

Member States to align substantive national laws with EU policy
objectives.
a. The European Union’s Economic Policy Objectives and the Virtuous
Cycle
The EU’s economic policy objectives are varied but one
overriding priority is to strengthen the economy and the single
market by stimulating investment to create jobs.50 Bolstering capital
markets and encouraging cross-border investment is a prerequisite
to this objective.51 Indeed, the free flow of capital is one of the EU’s
fundamental principles. 52 The EU’s ability to implement this
principle has been mixed. The European economy is as large as the
U.S. economy, “but Europe’s equity markets are less than half the
size, [and] its debt markets less than a third.”53 Borrowing costs,
access to credit, and capital liquidity—including cross-border
investment—are directly affected by default risk and creditor
recoveries in distressed scenarios. 54 Suboptimal restructuring
processes diminish creditor recoveries and inhibit capital flow. 55
See Capital Markets Action Plan, supra note 31, at 3.
The ultimate goal has been described as the “Capital Markets Union”—one
true single market for capital across the EU. See id. at 4-6.
52
See Capital Markets Action Plan, supra note 31, at 3
53 See id. (stating that the gap between individual Member States is greater
than the gap between Europe and the US).
54 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 2 (“Importantly, insolvency
matters are also a deterrent for cross-border expansion and investments. Many
investors mention uncertainty over insolvency rules or the risk of lengthy or
complex insolvency procedures in another country as a main reason for not
investing or not entering into a business relationship outside their own country. A
higher degree of harmoni[z]ation in insolvency law is thus essential for a wellfunctioning single market and for a true Capital Markets Union.”).
55 See id. at 3 (“The quality of Member States’ restructuring and insolvency
frameworks directly affects creditors’ recovery rates. World Bank indicators
suggest that in the EU recovery rates vary between 30% in Croatia and Romania,
and 90% in Belgium and Finland. Recovery rates are higher in economies where
restructuring is the most common insolvency proceeding. On average, in such
economies creditors can expect to recover 83% of their claims, against an average of
57% in liquidation procedures. While these outcomes also reflect economic factors
such as the overall health of the economy, they underline the importance of a
comprehensive insolvency framework, anchored in a strong institutional and
cultural setting, in delivering better outcomes for society.”) (citations omitted).
50
51
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Divergent restructuring laws suppress successful restructurings and
preclude risk assessment, which drives up borrowing costs and can
restrict access to credit entirely.56 This is the primary reason that EU
Institutions have focused on implementing a comprehensive
restructuring framework across Member States.57
Myriad economic benefits are available to the extent that EU
restructuring laws become more coherent and can be implemented
uniformly. I describe this phenomenon as the virtuous cycle.
Primarily, efficient and effective in-court processes facilitate
successful restructurings of financially viable companies. A system
that makes restructurings a meaningful option is optimal because
restructurings limit unnecessary liquidations, which destroy
enterprise value, suppress creditor recoveries, and cause employee
displacement. 58 Further, these system facets would improve the
likelihood of out-of-court settlements with creditors. Out-of-court
restructurings are far less disruptive to a business than courtsupervised proceedings and recovery rates for creditors are
invariably greater.59 Process costs are reduced and process speed is
accelerated. 60 Overall, successful out-of-court restructurings help
See id. at 2.
See id.
58
The law in many Member States steers—perhaps unintentionally—viable
businesses towards liquidation. Approximately 200,000 EU companies go
bankrupt each year, resulting in 1.7 million job losses every year. One in four of
these liquidations are cross-border insolvencies. Theoretically, “[a] significant
percentage of firms and related jobs could be saved” through preventive
procedures and restructurings. Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 2. Further,
“[d]ata shows that the highest recovery rates for creditors are in economies where
restructuring is the most common insolvency proceeding and that 45% of OECD
economies use restructuring as the most common way to save viable firms. They
also have an average recovery rate of 83 cents on the dollar, versus 57 cents on the
dollar in countries where liquidation is the prevalent outcome.” Id. at 13.
Unfortunately, from 1999 to 2012, restructurings—as opposed to liquidation or
going-concern sales—occurred in Germany in only two percent of all business
insolvencies. See Eidenmüller, supra note 38, at 15. The restructuring tally is only
slightly better in the UK (approximately 10% in 2016), Spain (approximately 10% in
2015), and Italy (approximately 5% in 2014). See id.
59 See STEFANIA BARIATTI, ROBERT VAN GALEN, INSOL EUR., STUDY ON A NEW
APPROACH TO BUSINESS FAILURE AND INSOLVENCY 20 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 INSOL
STUDY],
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3299431a86ac-11e5-b8b7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-152035587
[https://perma.cc/GRG6-FHZ8].
60 See id. at 9.
56
57
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reduce borrowing costs. 61 However, out-of-court settlement
discussions occur in the shadow of in-court proceedings. Indeed,
out-of-court restructurings are difficult to undertake when the
potential recoveries through a court proceeding are highly
unpredictable. 62 A more predictable restructuring system allows
creditors a proper frame of reference in developing their settlement
options.
In the aggregate, a system that deemphasizes liquidations and
encourages out-of-court settlements and in-court reorganizations of
financially viable companies enhances creditor recoveries, which
reduce borrowing costs.63 Further, the risk profile of cross-border
lending becomes more manageable, facilitating that type of lending
and improving access to credit.64
The virtuous cycle is realized through these dynamics.
Entrepreneurial activity increases, restructurings are destigmatized,
and businesses have the ability to withstand cyclical market
downturns.65 The overall benefits to capital markets and borrowers
are profound.
Unfortunately, as detailed in the next section, the virtuous cycle
is elusive. The EU has been unable to spur the implementation of
an efficient and effective restructuring system overarching its
Member States.

See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 2.
In other words, systemic obstacles exist to out-of-court settlement when
parties lack meaningful information regarding their alternatives to settlement. I
agree with scholars who have argued that the highly unpredictable nature of the
valuation fight embedded in a Chapter 11 plan confirmation process represents an
incentive for consensual stakeholder bargaining. However, that is merely one
unpredictable variable that exists among other relatively predictable variables in
the US restructuring system. As detailed in Part III.a., infra, I assert that too many
facets of the EU restructuring framework lack meaningful predictability, which
undermines out-of-court settlement.
63 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 2-3.
64
See id. at 2.
65 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 3, 6.
61
62
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b. The Regulatory Framework
i.

The European Insolvency Regulation

A “regulation” is one of the primary ways that EU Institutions
advance policy objectives. Regulations provide provisions that have
a general application to all Member States, though there may be
differing practical effects for the various individual parties or
entities to which they apply.66 Regulations are also binding in their
entirety and will apply in identical terms throughout the EU. 67
Regulations are an instrument of a single EU legal order and are
expected to receive a uniform interpretation. 68 Finally, Member
States may not enact national law that has the effect of modifying a
regulation. 69
In order to provide a procedural framework and choice-of-law
rules for cross-border bankruptcy cases, 70 a regulation for
insolvency proceedings was entered into force on May 31, 2002
(“EIR”).71 The EIR contained “rules on jurisdiction for insolvency
proceedings, the recognition of decisions with respect to such
proceedings, and the coordination of multiple proceedings
involving a single debtor.”72
The EIR addressed bankruptcy tourism in its preamble, noting
that “[i]t is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal
market to avoid incentives for the parties to transfer assets or judicial
proceedings from one Member State to another, seeking to obtain a

66
See MOSS, FLETCHER & ISAACS, supra note 45; see also Consolidated Version of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 171-72 (“A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding
in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.”). For example, the
European Council will adopt a regulation when it seeks to impose common
safeguards on goods imported from outside the EU.
67
See MOSS, FLETCHER & ISAACS, supra note 45, at 25.
68
See id.
69
See id. at 26.
70 See Horst Eidenmüller, Abuse of Law in the Context of European Insolvency Law,
6 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2009).
71 See Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) (EC) [hereinafter EIR].
72 Id.
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more favorable legal position (forum shopping).” 73 The EIR
effectuated this in Article 3 by enabling a main insolvency
proceeding to be opened only in the Member State where the debtor
had its COMI.74 The EIR described COMI as “the place where the
debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis
and is therefore ascertainable by third parties.”75 Article 3 further
provides that the place of the debtor’s registered office is presumed
to be the COMI in the absence of proof to the contrary.76
By design, the EIR had a limited scope. The regulation did not
attempt to address any substantive restructuring law or the ultimate
resolution of restructuring cases. Consequently, the regulation did
little to address deficiencies in the EU restructuring framework that
were apparent by the following decade.
ii.

Guidance from the European Commission

On December 12, 2012, the European Commission adopted a
report on the application of the European Insolvency Regulation
(the “2012 Report on the EIR”).77 The report noted that the EIR was
“generally regarded as a successful instrument for the coordination
of cross-border insolvency proceedings” but guidance as to
substantive restructuring law was absent. 78 As to bankruptcy
tourism, the report touted the use of a debtor’s COMI in determining
jurisdiction for restructuring cases. 79 The report acknowledged
that—despite the otherwise rigorous standards established by the
COMI-test and further clarified by the Court of Justice of the
European Union (“CJEU”)—corporations frequently forum
Id. pmbl. 4.
Id. art. 3.
75 Id. pmbl. 13.
76 Id.
77
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee on the Application of Council Regulation (EC)
No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, COM (2012) 743 final (Dec.
12,
2012),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52012DC0743
[https://perma.cc/CQ4ZKAXK].
78 Id. § 1.2.
79 Id. § 3.1
73
74
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shopped in order to benefit from what they perceived as more
effective restructuring processes.80 However, the 2012 Report on the
EIR took a neutral view on this behavior. Indeed, the report
explained that
[bankruptcy tourism] cannot per se be regarded as abusive
or illegitimate. First, COMI moves of companies have been
accepted by the CJEU as a legitimate exercise of the freedom
of establishment . . . . Moreover, COMI relocation often
benefits creditors rather than disadvantaging them. Often,
relocations are even driven by the (senior) creditors in an
attempt to rescue or restructure the company. There are
several cases where COMI relocation to the UK allowed the
successful restructuring of a company because of the
flexibility which English insolvency law grants companies in
this respect.81
Business failures in the EU received a considerable amount of
attention in the years following the Great Recession. In 2012, the
European Commission designated the modernization of EU
insolvency law as a key action in order to improve business survival
rates and creditor recoveries. 82 In 2014, INSOL Europe—the
European association of insolvency professionals—issued a
comparative analysis of business failure and insolvency in Member
States as of October 2013.83 The 2014 INSOL Study highlighted the
significant variance in national restructuring laws across the EU and
how this fact creates a level of unpredictability that undermined
corporate restructuring, capital markets, and cross-border
investments.84

Id.
Id.
82
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the
Single Market Act II, § 2.2, COM (2012) 573 final (Oct. 3, 2012), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52012DC0573
[https://perma.cc/6ND6-FECH].
83 See 2014 INSOL STUDY, supra note 59, at 5-6.
84 See id. at 6-10.
80
81
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Building on the 2014 INSOL Study, the European Commission
issued a recommendation on March 3, 2014.85 The recommendation
acknowledged that the EU’s key objectives related to corporate
restructuring—lowering borrowing costs, improving capital
markets efficiency, and facilitating successful in-court and out-ofcourt restructurings—would remain elusive without greater
uniformity across Member States’ substantive restructuring laws.86
Therefore, the recommendation included numerous proposals
regarding restructuring law and encouraged Member States to
incorporate the recommendations into their respective national
laws. 87
Unfortunately, the recommendation failed to spur
meaningful action among Member States.88
iii. Guidance from the Court of Justice and Real Seat Theory
During this time, the CJEU provided guidance on the
interpretation of the regulatory framework noted above. More
specifically, the court’s rulings in Eurofood and Interedil added
texture to the definition of COMI 89 and embraced the “real seat”
theory.
Eurofood90 involved a dispute regarding the appropriate location
for the main insolvency proceedings of Eurofood IFSC Ltd.
(“Eurofood”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parmalat SpA
registered in Ireland. In December 2003, Parmalat SpA had been
admitted to an insolvency proceeding in Italy. 91 The following
month, one of Eurofood’s creditors asserted that Eurofood was
insolvent and sought to institute liquidation proceedings against the
85
Commission Recommendation 2014/135, 2014 O.J. (L 74) 65 [hereinafter
2014 Commission Recommendation].
86 See id. ¶¶ 2-3.
87 See id. ¶ 1.
88 Cf. Eidenmüller, supra note 70, at 4 (noting that businesses continue to forum
shop).
89
The EIR does not define COMI, but Recital 13 in the EIR preamble provides
that “the ‘center of main interests’ should correspond to the place where the debtor
conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and [which] is
therefore ascertainable by third parties.” EIR, supra note 71.
90
Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd, 2006 E.C.R. I-3854.
91 Id. para. 18.
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company in Ireland.92 The High Court appointed a liquidator.93 In
February 2004, Eurofood was admitted as part of Parmalat’s
insolvency proceeding, and the liquidator in the Parmalat case was
appointed to oversee Eurofood. 94 A jurisdictional war erupted
between the Italian and Irish courts with various questions being
directed to the CJEU.95
The CJEU was asked to determine, inter alia, the critical factors
for identifying a subsidiary’s COMI where the subsidiary and its
parent have registered offices in two different Member States.96 The
court first explained that COMI is a concept unique to the EIR and
must be interpreted in a uniform way, uninfluenced by Member
State national law.97 In exploring the contours of COMI, the court
noted that the phrase contemplates consideration of criteria that “are
both objective and ascertainable by third parties. That objectivity
and that possibility of ascertainment by third parties are necessary
in order to ensure legal certainty and foreseeability” regarding the
location of a main insolvency proceeding.98
The court acknowledged that the EIR’s Article 3(1) created a
presumption that the place of the debtor’s registered office is the
center of its main interests.99 That presumption “can be rebutted
only if factors [that] are both objective and ascertainable by third
parties enable it to be established that an actual situation exists” that
does not align with the impression conveyed by the location of the
registered office.100 To clarify this proposition, the court offered a
specific example where the presumption would be rebutted.101 In
many cases, a debtor carries out the bulk of its business operations
in one Member State while carrying out virtually none of its business

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id. para. 19.
Id. para. 20.
Id. para. 21.
See id. paras. 22-25.
Id. para. 26.
Id. para. 31.
Id. para. 33.
Id. para. 6.
Id. para 34.
Id. paras. 35-36.
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operations in the Member State in which it has its registered office.102
In this case, there is a strong incongruence in the signals sent to
creditors.103 Consequently, the court explained, third parties will
invariably be able to establish that objective and ascertainable
factors rebut the Article 3(1) presumption.104
As to venue decisions, Eurofood serves to dilute the certainty
offered by reliance on the location of a debtor’s registered office. The
qualitative assessment advocated by the court subjects debtors to
additional scrutiny and limits tourism options.
The CJEU further explored the contours of COMI in Interedil.105
In that case, Interedil transferred its registered office from Italy to
the United Kingdom in 2001.106 As a consequence, the company was
removed from the register of companies in Italy. 107 Subsequently,
Interedil was acquired by another company, and the title to
properties that Interedil owned in Italy was transferred to
Windomist Ltd.108 Interedil was removed from the UK register of
companies in July 2002.109 In October 2003, a creditor of Interedil
filed a petition to open bankruptcy proceedings against Interedil in
Italy.110 Interedil challenged the jurisdiction of the Italian court.111
The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation ruled that the Article
3(1) presumption had been rebutted due to various circumstances,
including (i) Interedil’s ownership of immovable property in Italy;
(ii) a lease agreement involving Interedil and two hotel complexes;
(iii) a contract involving Interedil and a banking institution; and (iv)
“the Bari register of companies had not been notified of the transfer

102 This is the typical scenario in the United States where a super-majority of
Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware but virtually none have any
meaningful business operations in the state.
See Delaware Division of
Corporations, supra note 14.
103
Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd, 2006 E.C.R. I-3854, para. 27.
104
Id. para. 37.
105
Case C-396/09, Interedil Srl (in liq.) v. Fallimento Interedil Srl, 2012 E.C.R.
I-9939.
106 Id. para. 10.
107
Id.
108 Id. para. 11.
109
Id.
110 Id. para. 12.
111 Id. para. 13.
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of Interedil’s registered office.”112 The proceedings were stayed in
order to direct the jurisdictional questions, inter alia, to the CJEU.113
The CJEU addressed the questions posed by the dispute by first
agreeing with the Advocate General’s point that the EIR’s Recital 13
made clear Parliament’s intention to attach greater importance to the
place in which a company has its central administration—as
opposed to its registered office—as the criterion for determining
venue.114 The court then reaffirmed its Eurofood ruling, explaining
that a debtor’s COMI “must be identified by reference to criteria that
are both objective and ascertainable by third parties, in order to
ensure legal certainty and foreseeability concerning the
determination” of jurisdiction.115 The court noted that the Article
3(1) presumption is well-founded to the extent that “the bodies
responsible for the management and supervision of a company are
in the same place as its registered office and the management
decisions of the company are taken [in that locale and] in a manner
ascertainable by third parties.” 116 But the presumption may be
rebutted if central administration is not located in the same venue as
the registered office.117
The court emphasized that Article 3(1) is subject to a qualitative
assessment, 118 which implicitly endorsed real seat theory as
opposed to incorporation theory. 119 Therefore, in restructuring

Id. para. 16.
Id. para. 17.
114 See id. paras. 48, 69 (acknowledging AG Kokott’s opinion delivered on
March 10, 2011).
115 Id. para. 49.
116 Id. para. 50.
117 Id. para. 51.
118
Id.
119 As explained by the European Union’s Study on the Law Applicable to
Companies, under the incorporation theory
112
113

the rules applicable to companies are determined by the law at the place
of incorporation, irrespective of the commercial links between the foreign
company and the host state. Thus, following this approach, a foreign
company will be recognized and retain its legal capacity and internal
organization, even where its headquarters or significant parts (or indeed
all) of its operations are located or moved to a host state following this
approach.
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cases, the jurisdictional inquiry must take into account “all the
places in which the debtor company pursues economic activities and
all those in which it holds assets, in so far as those places are
ascertainable by third parties.” 120 The court’s interpretation
confirms that a significant level of complexity is embedded in the
venue question. The court notes that the factors the Italian court
considered in finding that Italy was the appropriate venue—
including the location of immovable property, lease agreement, and
financial contracts—are all meaningful criteria but
cannot be regarded as sufficient factors to rebut the
presumption unless a comprehensive assessment of all the
relevant factors makes it possible to establish, in a manner
that is ascertainable by third parties, that the company’s
actual center of management and supervision and of the
management of its interests is located in that other Member
State.121
The ruling serves to reaffirm Eurofood’s qualitative assessment
methodology; the effect of which is to subject venue decisions to
comprehensive, fact-intensive scrutiny.
iv. The Recast EIR
In 2015, the European Commission revisited the EIR in order to
“enhance the effective administration of cross-border insolvency
proceedings.”122 As a result, the European Insolvency Regulation
The real seat doctrine, on the other hand, attempts to determine the
jurisdiction the company is in fact most closely connected with. While
there is no single way of determining what constitutes the ‘closest
connection’, the central administration or headquarters of a company are
often used by Member States following this approach.
CARSTEN GERNER-BEUERLE, FEDERICO M. MUCCIARELLI, EDMUND-PHILLIP SCHUSTER,
MATHIAS M. SIEMS, STUDY ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO COMPANIES 25 (2017),
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/259a1dae-1a8c-11e7808e-01aa75ed71a1 [https://perma.cc/J6KG-3SD6].
120 Case C-396/09, Interedil Srl (in liq.) v. Fallimento Interedil Srl, 2012 E.C.R.
I-9939, para. 52.
121 Id. para. 53.
122
See Council Regulation 2015/848, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19, at Recital (1)
[hereinafter Recast EIR].
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was recast and took effect on June 26, 2017 (the “Recast EIR”).123 The
Recast EIR sought to, inter alia,
(i) [address] pre-insolvency or hybrid proceedings, (ii)
clarify[] the concept of Center of Main Interests (COMI) [in
order to reduce bankruptcy tourism incentives], (iii)
strengthen[] the role of the main proceedings when several
proceedings are opened against the same debtor in different
Member States, (iv) introduce[] new rules on the publication
of the proceedings and lodging of claims, (v) and include[] a
new chapter for the insolvency of a group of companies.124
The Recast EIR adopts many of the general structural
adjustments advocated by the Report on the EIR.125 However, the
Recast EIR implements a more aggressive regulatory approach to
bankruptcy tourism. 126 Primarily, Recital (5) argues that internal
markets will not function properly if regulatory incentives127 exist
for parties to engage in bankruptcy tourism—defined as an attempt
by a party to “transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one
Member State to another seeking to obtain a more favorable legal
position to the detriment of the general body of creditors.”128 The
Recast EIR is more explicit in Recital (29), which provides that
fraudulent or abusive forum shopping should be prevented.129 The
EIR’s description of COMI is virtually unchanged, 130 but Recitals
(28) and (30) establish a creditor-centric perspective for COMI

123
Francisco Garcimartin, The EU Insolvency Regulation Recast: Scope and Rules
on Jurisdiction, 1 n.1 (Mar. 21, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2752412
[https://perma.cc/3U5Z-FTY2].
124 Id. at 2.
125
Id.
126 Id. at 13.
127 This statement implies that EU regulations should not create incentives to
forum shop. Naturally, this implication overlooks the fact that the incentives for
forum shopping are created by the bankruptcy market. EU regulations are better
positioned to impose legal restrictions to prevent the practice as opposed to
attempting to create disincentives.
128 See Recast EIR, supra note 122, at Recital (5).
129 Id. at Recital (29).
130
COMI is described as “the place where the debtor conducts the
administration of its interests on a regular basis and which is ascertainable by third
parties.” Id. art. 3(1).
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assessment. 131 Primarily, courts are instructed that “[w]hen
determining whether the center of the debtor’s main interests is
ascertainable by third parties, special consideration should be given to
the creditors and to their perception as to where a debtor conducts the
administration of its interests.” 132 Further, the presumption that the
location of a debtor’s registered office establishes COMI is portrayed
as a weak one. Indeed, notwithstanding the presumption, courts are
instructed to
carefully assess whether the cent[er] of the debtor’s main
interests is genuinely located in that Member State. In the
case of a company, it should be possible to rebut this
presumption where the company’s central administration is
located in a Member State other than that of its registered
office, and where a comprehensive assessment of all the
relevant factors establishes, in a manner that is ascertainable
by third parties, that the company’s actual center of
management and supervision and of the management of its
interests is located in that other Member State.133
In order to prevent abusive forum shopping, the presumption
does not apply at all if the debtor has “relocated its registered office
or principal place of business to another Member State within the 3month period prior to the” case opening.134 Further, the Recast EIR
instructs judges to assess on their “own motion” whether a debtor’s
center of main interests is actually located within the court’s
jurisdiction.135 And any judgment opening insolvency proceedings
must specify its jurisdictional basis.136
Article 3 also allows creditors to institute involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings, which offers creditors a way to combat

Id. at Recitals (28), (30).
Id. at Recital (28) (emphasis added).
133 Id. at Recital (30). This provision captures the CJEU’s reasoning in Interedil.
See MOSS, FLETCHER & ISAACS, supra note 45, at 446.
134 Recast EIR, supra note 122, at Recital (31).
135
Id. at Recital (27), and art. (4). United States venue provisions do not
instruct judges overseeing corporate bankruptcy cases to undertake this inquiry sua
sponte—and most do not—though some scholars have recommended the change.
See Parikh, supra note 22, at 201.
136 See Recast EIR, supra note 122, art. 4(1).
131
132
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debtor tourism. 137 Article 5 offers any creditor the ability to
challenge the court’s jurisdictional decision and seek judicial review
of such decision. 138 Finally, the Recast EIR continues secondary
proceedings that may involve courts in numerous other Member
States and be overseen by insolvency practitioners.139 In such a case,
Article 66 provides that in the event at least two-thirds of
restructuring practitioners agree that one particular court is the most
appropriate court for the opening of group coordination
proceedings, then that court shall have exclusive jurisdiction.140
Ultimately, the desire to aggressively regulate bankruptcy
tourism is clear when viewing the recast provisions of Article 3
“with entirely new provisions enacted as Articles 4 and 5 . . . all of
which must be read in the light of . . . Recitals (22) to (38).”141
v.

A New Study of Business Failure

Despite the Recast EIR’s new procedural guidance, substantive
restructuring law at the Member State-level remained incongruent.
This inaction prompted a more aggressive response. In 2015, the
European Commission acknowledged that the EU’s fragmented
restructuring laws were inhibiting corporate growth and capital
market efficiency142 and commissioned a new comparative study on
substantive restructuring law throughout the EU. The study
Id. art. 3(4)(b)(i).
Id. art. 5(1).
139
Id. at art. 3. The insolvency practitioners overseeing secondary
proceedings are akin to Chapter 11 trustees in U.S. bankruptcy courts.
140 Id. art. 66(1).
141 See MOSS, FLETCHER & ISAACS, supra note 45, at 64.
142
See JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER, COMPLETING EUROPE’S ECONOMIC AND
MONETARY UNION 7 (2015), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/betapolitical/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q26-BHAA]; see
also 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 25 (noting that “(i) there is a need for
greater convergence in insolvency law and restructuring proceedings across
Member State, (ii) the inefficiency and divergence of insolvency laws make it harder
to assess and manage credit risk, and that (iii) enhancing legal certainty and
encouraging the timely restructuring of borrowers in financial distress is
particularly relevant for the success of strategies to address the problem of nonperforming loans in some Member States.” (citing “Towards the Completion of the
Banking Union,” COM (2015) 587 final (Nov. 24, 2015))).
137
138
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analyzing business failure in the EU was published in January 2016
(the “2016 Commission Study”).143
The 2016 Commission Study documented a comparative study
on substantive restructuring laws throughout the EU. More
specifically, the study delineated the manner in which Member
States address a number of fundamental restructuring issues,
including director liability, creditor priorities, avoidance, initiation
of proceedings, reorganization plans, creditor voting, out-of-court
restructuring options, and general procedures. 144 Ultimately, the
study highlighted the lack of uniformity for restructuring laws
across the EU.145 The depth of this variance and the ultimate harm
the discrepancy could cause the EU’s economic policy objectives
prompted action.
vi. The Restructuring Directive
A “directive” is a legislative act that sets out broad goals that all
Member States must achieve. 146 However, a directive affords
Member States flexibility. 147 Individual countries construct their
own means to fulfill these goals and draft national laws to
implement this design. 148 On November 22, 2016, the EU
Commission published its proposal for a new restructuring directive
(the “Restructuring Directive”).149 In July 2019, the EU Parliament
See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30.
Id. at i-vi.
145 See id. at 2-8.
146
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 172.
147
See Id.
148 See Id. (“A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon
each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods.”). For example, on April 17, 2019, the
European Council adopted a Copyright Directive that had 4 broad goals: (i)
protecting press publications; (ii) reducing the value gap between the profits made
by internet platforms and by content creators; (iii) encouraging collaboration
between these two groups; and (iv) creating copyright exceptions for text- and datamining. See Directive 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 April 2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and
Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92.
149 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34.
143
144
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adopted the Restructuring Directive. 150 Member States have two
years from the adoption date to pass national law tailored to fulfill
these goals.151
The Restructuring Directive seeks to remove various obstacles
inhibiting a well-functioning single market.152 The discrepancy in
substantive restructuring law across Member States is the
fountainhead for most of these obstacles. The Restructuring
Directive acknowledges the limitations of the Recast EIR—namely,
that the regulation standardizes a few procedural matters at the
periphery of restructuring conflicts but fails to tackle significant
discrepancies in substantive law that eclipse procedural
alignment. 153 The directive provides structural guidance as to
various administrative and non-core matters, including out-of-court
restructurings, 154 review of bankruptcy professionals and their
services, 155 bankruptcy jurist training, 156 and data collection. 157
More importantly, the directive also seeks to establish minimum
standards as to the hydraulics of restructuring laws, including the
automatic stay, debtor financing, restructuring plans, valuation
methodologies, case appeals, and discharge.158 Unfortunately, the
establishment of minimum standards represents only incremental
improvement.
Collectively, the EU’s regulatory framework and CJEU case law
create the EU’s design for corporate restructuring (“EU
Restructuring Law”). As noted above, the design seeks to fulfill
lofty economic policy objectives. However, as explored in the
150
Patrick J. Potter, Dania Slim, & Jihyun Park, The European Union
Restructuring
Directive,
pillsbury
(July
17,
2019),
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/european-union-restruct
uring-directive.html [https://perma.cc/MP5M-5AF5].
151
Alexandra Schluck-Amend, EU Parliament Adopts Directive on Preventive
Restructuring
Frameworks,
LEXOLOGY,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4e2895c0-7f81-41b9-8033-4dbf
769a3089 [https://perma.cc/T9YQ-YREA]. Note that the implementation period
can be extended by one year on request, but such requests are rarely granted.
152 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 14.
153 See id. at 9-10.
154 Id. at 25.
155 Id. at 35.
156 Id. art. 24(1).
157 Id. art. 29.
158 See id. at 21-22.
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following section, intractable problems embedded in the EU
restructuring framework preclude progress toward these objectives.
III. INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS EMBEDDED IN THE EU’S
RESTRUCTURING FRAMEWORK
The previous section explored the European Union’s economic
policy objectives and how its corporate restructuring framework is
being modified to advance these objectives. Despite these changes,
the framework is plagued by two intractable problems: 1)
significant divergence of substantive restructuring law across
Member States that undermines predictability and promotes
disparate treatment; and 2) lack of restructuring experience in the
judiciary that suppresses efficient and successful restructurings.
a. The Harmonization Quandary
The EU recognizes that uniform restructuring laws can bolster
capital markets and improve the probability of meaningful creditor
recoveries and successful corporate restructurings, both within and
without judicial proceedings. 159 Harmonization of restructuring
laws is essential for a well-functioning EU single-market. 160
Unfortunately, the divergence of substantive restructuring law
across Member States is significant. Debtors face disparate
treatment on fundamental issues, including (i) the ability to file for

See id. at 2-3.
See id. at 2; see also 2014 INSOL STUDY supra note 59, at 176-82; 2016
COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 25 (“[T]here is a need for greater convergence
in insolvency law and restructuring proceedings across Member State[s and] the
inefficiency and divergence of insolvency laws make it harder to assess and manage
credit risk . . . .”); GIORGIO CHERUBINI, ET AL., INSOL EUR. HARMONISATION OF
INSOLVENCY
LAW
AT
EU
LEVEL
7
(2010),
https://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/ipol-juri_nt2010419633_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B7PW-R5ER] (“[D]isparities between national insolvency and
restructuring laws create obstacles, competitive advantages and/or disadvantages
or difficulties for companies with cross-border activities or ownership within the
EU.”).
159
160
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bankruptcy in advance of an actual insolvency;161 (ii) management
of the debtor post-filing and appointment of an insolvency
practitioner; 162 (iii) the automatic stay; 163 (iv) ranking creditor
unsecured and secured claims; 164 (v) post-petition super-priority
financing; 165 (vi) avoidance actions, including preference 166 and
161
Many countries require that the debtor be insolvent—or at least in the zone
of insolvency—and able to establish that fact (e.g. Croatia, Finland, Greece,
Hungary, and Italy). See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 251-54.
162
In many countries, debtor-in-possession management is “seldom used”;
rather, an insolvency practitioner is appointed immediately upon filing of a case
and oversees management (e.g., Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, and Sweden) or
assumes some or all management authority (e.g., Malta, Ireland, and Poland). See
2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 256-58; 2014 INSOL STUDY, supra note 59,
at 26, 30-32. However, in other countries, insolvency practitioners are not
appointed automatically (e.g., Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, and Slovenia), but the
debtor is often subject to aggressive supervision. See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra
note 30, at 256-58. Some commentators have argued that a supervisor or
bankruptcy trustee should be appointed in all cases in order to play an oversight
role and safeguard creditor interests. See, e.g., Horst Eidenmüller & Kristin van
Zwieten, Restructuring the European Business Enterprise: the European Commission’s
Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency, 16 EUR. BUS.
ORG. L. REV. 625, 660-61 (2015). Naturally, such an approach would contravene a
long-standing practice in US bankruptcy cases. I argue that creditor interests can
more effectively be protected by other means (e.g., a creditors’ committee or
appointment of a trustee upon motion) that are far less disruptive to management
during a period where disruption can preclude a successful reorganization.
Further, this type of mandatory rule may undermine management autonomy and
ultimately encourage management teams to irrationally delay bankruptcy filings to
the detriment of all stakeholders. See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 228
(“The fact that the management of the debtor will not be displaced in favour of an
outside [insolvency practitioner] encourages timely use of the restructuring
option.”).
163
In a few countries the automatic stay does not restrict all creditor-collection
actions (e.g., Austria and Bulgaria). Some countries have a stay, but the stay is
limited to unsecured claims (e.g., Poland). See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note
30, at 261-64; see also 2014 INSOL STUDY, supra note 59, at 34-35.
164
For example, employee claims can rank ahead of secured creditor claims
in some Member States (e.g., France, Greece, and Spain). See 2016 COMMISSION
STUDY, supra note 30, at 124-25.
165
Many countries have no special provisions encouraging post-petition
financing (e.g., Austria, Bulgaria, and Sweden). Many of the countries that do
encourage the practice, fail to have specific provisions protecting post-petition
lenders from clawback actions (e.g., Finland and Ireland). See id. at 278-80.
166
Member States generally allow debtors to pursue preference actions, but
some have extremely generous look back periods that extend for multiple years
(e.g., Netherlands, Germany, and Lithuania) while others allow for only a 3-month
look back period (e.g., Denmark, Finland, and Sweden). See id. at 147-53.
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fraudulent transfer 167 actions; (vii) appointment of creditor
committees; 168 (viii) prepackaged bankruptcy cases; 169 (ix)
cramdown of dissenting creditor voting classes and attendant
protections, including the best interests test and absolute priority
rule;170 and (x) asset sales.171 Further, the length of time necessary to
resolve complex restructuring cases varies significantly.172
Variance in substantive law undermines restructuring cases in a
material way.173 Unpredictability regarding available debtor relief,
restructuring pathways, and creditor rights precludes successful
restructurings; failures suppress creditor recoveries, which drive up

167
Fraudulent transfer actions are a meaningful recovery tool in U.S.
bankruptcy cases and can represent billion-dollar actions, particularly in
bankruptcy cases involving prepetition leveraged buyouts. See, e.g., In re Tribune
Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016) (creditors sought to
avoid a multi-billion dollar leveraged buyout). However, fraudulent transfer law
in the EU is unevenly developed. For example, in many Member States transactions
may only be avoided if the debtor intended to damage creditor interests (e.g., Czech
Republic, Portugal, and Poland). Further, the statute of limitations varies wildly.
“In Austria, Croatia, Germany, and Norway the period in which transactions can
be challenged is 10 years,“ while in other countries it is as short as 2 years (e.g.,
Portugal and Romania). See 2014 INSOL STUDY, supra note 59, at 159-60.
168
The existence, power, and composition of creditor committees varies
significantly across Member States. See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at
192-93. Some Member States do not contemplate appointment of a creditors’
committee (e.g. Spain, Belgium, and Slovakia). Id. at 193-95. In countries that allow
appointment, courts rarely do so (e.g. Luxembourg and Netherlands). Id.
169
Aside from France, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, and Slovenia, Member
States fail to offer debtors the option of a prepackaged bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
at 202.
170
”There is in fact considerable variation on the conditions necessary for
approval of a restructuring plan in the EU Member States . . . [and it] does not
appear that the ‘absolute priority’ principle is expressly incorporated in the laws of
many, if any, EU Member States . . .” Id. at 239-42.
171
The procedures and requirements of asset sales are inconsistent, often
times resulting in “long drawn out and complicated process[es].” Id. at 205.
172 2014 INSOL STUDY, supra note 59, at 39 (“The length of full insolvency
proceedings varies considerably in most Member States: in a large number of States
the average length is two to three years.”) (citation omitted).
173
See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 2 (indicating cross-border
insolvencies often result in liquidation rather than restructuring due to inconsistent
legal frameworks across Member States); 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at
24 (suggesting “inefficient and divergent insolvency proceedings in the EU
prevent[] speedier debt restructuring”); CHERUBINI ET AL., supra note 160, at 27
(asserting lack of harmony between Member States’ insolvency processes impedes
business reorganization).
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borrowing costs and limit access to credit. 174 Further, ineffective
restructuring laws force potentially viable companies into
liquidation where value is lost.175 As noted above, the coalescence
of these factors inhibits capital markets and undermine growth.
Without greater harmonization, the EU will not be able to fulfill its
goals regarding capital market integration.
b. Experience Deficiencies in the Judiciary
Specialized bankruptcy courts are one of the most distinctive
characteristics of the US system. 176 The US federal judiciary is
divided into geographic regions. Each region has multiple
bankruptcy courts that hear only individual and corporate
bankruptcy matters.177 Further, almost all of these regions have a
bankruptcy appellate court that hears only appeals from bankruptcy
proceedings. 178 Bankruptcy judges at both of these levels are
eminently qualified to handle the nuance of restructuring laws and
the minutia of bankruptcy disputes.179 The depth and breadth of
collective experience in the US restructuring system represents an
overwhelming asset.180 Indeed, there exists “substantial empirical
evidence to demonstrate that large bankruptcy cases overseen by

174 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 15. Several Members States took
or have taken action independently and have recently enacted or started
preparatory work to adopt new rules to improve the preventive restructuring and
second chance framework. However, these national rules differ widely in content
and, as a result, provide an uneven level of transparency and protection for
investors. Investors may be obstructed from investing cross-border because the
costs of doing so are much higher than they need to be.
175
See id. at 2-3.
176
See generally Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural
Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384 (2012) (describing
the structure of the U.S. bankruptcy system and its central institutions and actors).
177
See UCLA-LoPucki Bankr. Rsch. Database, supra note 13.
178
See Court Insider: What is a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel?, U.S. CTS. (Nov. 26,
2012),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2012/11/26/court-insider-whatbankruptcy-appellate-panel [https://perma.cc/VMV5-FU4Y].
179 See VENUE REPORT, supra note 39, at 77.
180 Id.
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experienced judges have higher success rates.”181 The prospect of a
successful restructuring is dimmed without an experienced jurist
formulating necessary relief after weighing competing interests
among all stakeholders and encouraging settlements, when
necessary.182
Member States do not have specialized bankruptcy courts
comparable to what exists in the United States. 183 With limited
exception, judges overseeing restructuring cases are not
specialists. 184 Further, the few judges who do regularly oversee
restructuring cases invariably lack a comprehensive understanding
of restructuring concepts because almost all bankruptcy cases in
their courts are liquidation proceedings or asset sales. 185 For
example, from 1990 to 2012, restructurings—as opposed to
liquidations or going concern sales—occurred in Germany in only
2% of all business insolvencies.186 This phenomenon was duplicated
across Member States.187

181 Id. (citing Benjamin Charles Iverson, Joshua Madsen, Wei Wang & Qiping
Xu, Practice Makes Perfect: Judge Experience and Bankruptcy Outcomes, 28 (July 16,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3084318 [https://perma.cc/WM7W-EAC4]); see
also Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Survival, 62 UCLA L. REV.
970, 990, 1014 (2015) (concluding that the judge’s experience is “strongly correlated”
with the survival of the debtor and that “bankruptcy system participants can
increase the likelihood of the debtor company’s survival simply by shifting cases to
more experienced judges.”).
182
Empirical research supports this conclusion. Local bankruptcy courts that
Megacases eschewed in order to forum shop to Delaware had historically heard far
less chapter 11 bankruptcy cases than local bankruptcy courts in which Megacases
filed without forum shopping. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel Jr., An EfficiencyBased Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425,
461-63 (2006).
183 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 94. As noted above, due to Brexit
uncertainty, I have excluded the UK from Member State discussions and assumed
that the English courts may not be a viable restructuring venue option in upcoming
years.
184 See id. (noting that German restructuring judges are some of the few judges
in the EU that frequently have documentable knowledge in the area).
185 Eidenmüller, supra note 70, at 15.
186 Id.
187
Italy (~5% in 2014), Spain (~10% in 2015), and the UK (~10% in 2016), face
similar limitations. Id.
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The EU acknowledges that a lack of experience across the
judiciary compromises the bankruptcy system.188 The inexperience
effect is decidedly negative: due to a lack of confidence in the
system, many companies will delay a bankruptcy filing until such
time as liquidation is the only viable option; the percentage of
successful restructurings decline and capital markets continue to
resist cross-border lending. Further, to the extent that tourism
regulations limit companies to regions with inexperienced judges,
those companies will be subject to disparate treatment vis-à-vis
companies whose central administration happens to be located in a
Member State with more experienced judges. This discrepancy
further undermines the system and the EU’s economic policy
objectives.
c. The Bankruptcy Tourism Lever
Scholars have suggested various means to address the
harmonization quandary and reorganization inexperience within
Though these proposals are
Member States’ judiciary. 189
meaningful, any belief that these issues can be addressed in the
foreseeable future is misguided.
The EU works through
recommendations and directives in order to encourage Member
States to make substantive changes to national law. The EU has
repeatedly attempted to steer Member States to optimal

188 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 4, at Recital 39, art. 24 (acknowledging
the need for Member States to ensure that its judiciary is properly trained to manage
restructuring cases); see also Reforms to Dutch Bankruptcy Act Take in Force from 1
January
2019,
OSBORNE
CLARKE
(Nov.
16,
2018),
https://www.osborneclarke.com/insights/reforms-to-dutch-bankruptcy-act-take
-in-force-from-1-january-2019/ [https://perma.cc/UR49-MM8H] (noting that the
Dutch Government sought to address experience deficiencies in their judiciary by
allowing a restructuring judge overseeing a proceeding the ability to appoint other
judges to the case who may bring special expertise on complex issues).
189 See, e.g., Eidenmüller, supra note 38, at 28 (proposing that process certainty
can be bolstered if corporations were allowed to “opt into a European insolvency
regime in their charter”); Oren Sussman, The Economics of the EU’s Corporate
Insolvency Law and the Quest for Harmonization by Market Forces, in HANDBOOK OF
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS (2008) (arguing to the extent
harmonization is sought, harmonization by market forces is preferable to
harmonization through legislation and bureaucratic processes).
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restructuring law, but these urgings have been met with inaction.190
And there is no reason to believe that this intransigence will abate.
The result is an inherently deficient framework that will preclude
progress towards economic policy objectives. It is possible that the
framework will ultimately evolve into the intended form, but the
timeline for that evolution seems woefully protracted.
A
widespread financial correction currently consumes Europe and
will continue to decimate industries for years. 191 The EU’s
restructuring framework is ill-equipped to offer predictable or
comprehensive reorganization outcomes for the myriad
corporations that will soon be seeking relief.
Government
intervention can only stem the tide.
As detailed in Part V, infra, I propose a forum shopping model
similar to the one currently in place in the United States as a means
to address the intractable problems within the EU restructuring
framework. I believe the EU can easily facilitate bankruptcy
tourism, and the practice offers unique benefits. The proposal is
particularly attractive because the changes can be achieved through
direct EU action without the need for affirmative legislative action
from Member States. I believe the benefits from my proposal can be

190 See Eidenmüller, supra note 70, at 3-4 (“States such as the UK, Germany and
Italy, did not even react” to the European Commission’s 2014 Recommendation on
“a new approach to business failure and insolvency.”).
191 See, e.g., EUR. COMM., EUROPEAN ECONOMIC FORECAST 5-11
(July
2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economyfinance/ip132_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H3U-5D5R] (forecasting an incomplete
recovery in GDP growth by the end of 2021 as tourism and other industries struggle
to resume in the wake of COVID-19); Hanna Ziady, Europe’s Recession Will be Even
Deeper
than
Expected,
CNN
(July
8,
2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/07/economy/eu-commission-summer-2020-fore
cast/index.html [https://perma.cc/R7DP-YN9L] (emphasizing continued
lockdown restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic could further slow economic
recovery); Laurence Norman & Mari Martinez, Coronavirus Projected to Send
Eurozone
Into
Steep
Recession,
WALL
ST.
J.
(May
6,
2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-projected-to-send-eurozone-into-stee
p-recession-11588761057 [https://perma.cc/JQL9-GYSX] (acknowledging “a
growing consensus that the recent plunge in world-wide economic activity will be
followed by a slow, halting and uneven recovery”); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
AND DEV., CORONAVIRUS: THE WORLD ECONOMY AT RISK 8 (OECD Interim Economic
Assessment,
2020),
http://www.oecd.org/berlin/publikationen/InterimEconomic-Assessment-2-March-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6DH9-RQEN]
(cautioning lingering trade tensions compound downside risk to recovery due to
the global pandemic).
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realized within a relatively short period of time; as opposed to the
current trajectory, which could take decades.
However, before moving to the substance of my proposal, I
acknowledge that some scholars may argue that my proposal creates
the risk of a pyrrhic victory. Indeed, scholars have argued that
bankruptcy tourism is an inequitable practice that undermines
restructuring systems and produces suboptimal results for creditors
and stakeholders.192 EU Restructuring Law and, in particular, the
Recast EIR aggressively restrict bankruptcy tourism; going so far as
to argue that internal markets will not function properly if parties
are allowed to engage in the practice. 193 Ultimately, what is the
rationality in facilitating an arguably destabilizing practice?
In order to begin to answer that question, one must first
understand the type of controlled tourism that has proliferated in
the United States. The next section provides an overview of
jurisdictional arbitrage in the United States and the perceived
threats and deficiencies of the practice.

192 See Lynn LoPucki, Global and Out of Control, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 79, 79-103
(2005) (arguing an international bankruptcy system in which courts hearing forumshopped cases cannot be checked by competing courts and will result in corruption
and displacement of “corporate outsiders who have no means of controlling the
debtor’s choice of courts”); Lynn LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J.
143, 143 (2005) (warning under an increasingly universalist regime that creditors of
a multinational corporation will be harmed through their inability to determine
which country’s bankruptcy laws apply until the corporation has filed); see also
Peter Califano, Bankruptcy Reform – Everything You Need to Know Is in This Article, 29
COM. L. WORLD 8, 9 (2015) (acknowledging criticism leveled at the potential of
bankruptcy tourism in the U.S. to exclude filing companies’ “management,
employees, communities, and key constituencies” along with smaller creditors);
Parikh, supra note 22, at 197 (“[R]ampant forum shopping undermines the
perception and integrity of the bankruptcy system” by “erod[ing] public confidence
in the bankruptcy courts” and treating similarly situated parties differently);
LOPUCKI, supra note 6, at 137-81 (asserting courts hungry for large bankruptcy cases
cater to case placers at the expense of reaching the most equitable solutions); Lynn
LoPucki & William Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 34 (1991)
(suggesting case placers “may be able to manipulate the outcome of the case by
selecting a forum that will render a favorable decision” while some physically
distant parties are effectively excluded through relatively high costs to participate).
193 See Recast EIR, supra note 122, art. 3 (concentrating most jurisdiction over
an insolvent debtor within the Member State containing debtor’s “main interests”),
Recital 4 (“It is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market to avoid
incentives for parties to transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one Member
State to another, seeking to obtain a more favorable legal position . . . .”).
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IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING BANKRUPTCY TOURISM THROUGH THE
LENS OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
a. Controlled Tourism and How Permissive Venue Rules are Exploited
in the United States194
Bankruptcy Tourism has been ubiquitous in the United States
over the last thirty years, and the phenomenon’s trend line can be
established empirically.195 From 2007 to 2012, 69% of publicly held
companies with approximately $1.2 billion 196 or more in assets
(“Megacases”) strategically located bankruptcy cases in jurisdictions
that had no connection to their operations or headquarters in order
to take advantage of favorable law, court procedures, and jurists
perceived to be amendable.197 That is a 14% increase compared to
filings from 1991 to 1996.198 And the practice is more prevalent now.
Forty-eight of the eighty-eight Megacases filed between 1991 and
1996 had forum shopped.199 From 2007 to 2012, 110 of the 159 filed
Megacases had forum shopped.200 Consequently, between the two
periods, frequency with which Megacases forum shopped grew at a
statistically significant rate (14%) and the absolute number of
Megacases that forum shopped grew at a staggering rate (130%).201
The practice continues unabated.202 From General Motors filing for
This section is reproduced, in part, from Parikh, supra note 22, at 181-92.
Parikh, supra note 22, at 173-92.
196
This number is measured in 2007 dollars. The benchmark was $500 million
in 1980 and then was adjusted depending on the year the case was filed. For
example, a bankruptcy filed in 2007 would qualify as a Megacase if the debtor(s)
had assets with a fair market value of at least $1.2 billion. See UCLA-LOPUCKI
BANKR. RSCH. DATABASE, supra note 13.
197 Parikh, supra note 22, at 177-81.
198 See id. at 178.
199 See id. at 177.
200 See id.
201
Id.
202
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-839, CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY: STAKEHOLDERS HAVE MIXED VIEWS ON ATTORNEYS’ FEE GUIDELINES AND
VENUE
SELECTION
FOR
LARGE
CHAPTER
11
CASES
3
(2015),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672696.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8FJ2-SCF4]
(finding “many of the companies” engaged in “large Chapter 11 bankruptcies”
194
195
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bankruptcy in New York203 to the Los Angeles Dodgers filing for
bankruptcy in Delaware,204 the last thirty years has been a golden
age of bankruptcy tourism in the United States.
The freedom to engage in jurisdictional arbitrage is an
unintended consequence of permissive venue provisions in the
United States. For a corporate debtor, 28 U.S.C § 1408 provides four
primary bases for establishing venue in a district: (1) the debtor’s
principal place of business in the United States is in the district; (2)
the debtor’s principal assets in the United States are located in the
district; (3) the debtor is incorporated in the state in which the
district is found;205 or (4) a case concerning an affiliate of the debtor
is pending in the district.206
i.

Principal Place of Business

A company’s principal place of business is invariably the
optimal location for that company’s bankruptcy proceedings. The
selection of this venue engenders certainty and predictability. In the
US, the location of a debtor’s principal place of business is a question
of objective fact, not subjective intention, to be resolved after
considering relevant aspects of the debtor’s operations. 207 The
since October 2009 for which they filed in either the Southern District of New York
or Delaware were headquartered elsewhere).
203
Jon Swartz & Kevin McCoy, It’s Official: GM Files for Bankruptcy Protection,
ABC
NEWS
(June
1,
2009,
11:36
AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=7725901&page=1
[https://perma.cc/2ERN-5TG4].
204
See Parikh, supra note 22, at 162.
205
See Geographic Boundaries of the United States Courts of Appeals and United
COURTS,
States
District
Courts,
U.S.
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/CircuitMap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z3AM-XQPX]. Many states have multiple districts in which a
debtor can file. Id. For instance, California has four districts and multiple
bankruptcy courts within each district. California Bankruptcy Court Directory,
CALIFORNIABANKRUPTCY.INFO, http://www.californiabankruptcy.info/court.html
[https://perma.cc/4YRM-3FNJ]. Thus, under § 1408, a debtor incorporated in
California can file in any one of the four districts based on its place of incorporation.
206
28 U.S.C. § 1408.
207 See, e.g., In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., 150 F.3d 788, 795 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“[T]he principal place of business inquiry is primarily a factual one . . . .”); In re
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overarching question involves where the debtor, in the aggregate,
manages and initiates its business.208
Two primary tests are used to answer this question. 209 The
“nerve center” test advocates a more limited inquiry, 210 and
instructs courts to “look to the place where the debtor’s major,
business management decisions are made. Under [this test],
wherever the debtor’s primary decision-makers are congregated
will be the principal place of business.” 211 In other words, the
corporate headquarters and offices are invariably the principal place
of business. 212 The “operational” test probes further. 213 This test
evaluates the debtor’s day-to-day operations, considering not just
where major business management decisions are made but also the
location of: (i) the debtor’s books, records, accounting, and other
management information; (ii) personnel, equipment, and assets; (iii)
income generating activities and where debts were incurred; (iv)
bank accounts; and (v) day-to-day activities. 214 The Recast EIR’s
COMI test is similar to the operational test.215
In Hertz Corp. v. Friend,216 the Supreme Court sought to resolve a
circuit split concerning the meaning of the phrase “principal place
of business” provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) for purposes of
determining whether federal diversity jurisdiction existed.217 The
Court resolved the split in favor of the nerve center test, a choice that
Condor Expl., LLC, 294 B.R. 370, 374 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) (“[W]hat constitutes the
principal place of business of a corporation is a question of objective fact, not
subjective intention.”) (citing In re Standard Tank Cleaning Corp., 133 B.R. 562, 564
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991)).
208 See, e.g., In re Peachtree Lane, 150 F.3d at 795 (arguing the principal place of
business “is likely to be the place where its management decisions are made”); In re
Condor Expl., 294 B.R. at 374 (providing factors to determine an entity’s principal
place of business).
209
See Parikh, supra note 22, at 182-83. A few courts have used the “center of
corporate activities” test, which focuses on the center of a corporation’s production
or service activities.
210 In re Condor Expl., 294 B.R. at 374.
211 Id. (citing In re Peachtree Lane, 150 F.3d at 788).
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 See id.; In re Dock of the Bay, Inc., 24 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
215 See Section II.b.iv., supra.
216
559 U.S. 77 (2010).
217 Id. at 80.
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the Court believed would engender greater administrative
simplicity. 218 The Court explained that the “[principal place of
business] should normally be the place where the corporation
maintains its headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the
actual center of direction, control, and coordination . . . and not
simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings.”219
The Court found that the operational test was too complex and
forced judges to consider a variety of criteria and “weigh corporate
functions, assets and revenues different in kind, one from the
other.” 220 The Court concluded that the test led to inconclusive
decisions—needlessly complicating cases, fostering disputes and
appeals, eating up time and money, and ultimately diminishing “the
likelihood that results and settlements [would] reflect a claim’s legal
and factual merits.”221
The Hertz ruling does not foreclose discussion on the definition
of the principal place of business. Courts prior to the Hertz ruling
noted that differing policy considerations suggest that “tests for a
corporation’s principal place of business in diversity cases should
not be imported wholesale into bankruptcy venue law.” 222
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the differing policy objectives
between § 1332 and § 1408, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
“principal place of business” in § 1332 must inform any
interpretation of the identical phrase in § 1408.223 The Hertz ruling,
Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 93.
220 Id. at 90–92, 96.
221 Id. at 94.
222 In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., 206 B.R. 913, 922 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing
In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 596 F.2d 1239, 1247 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979)), aff’d
150 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 1998). Note that § 1332 and § 1408 have differing policy
objectives. Diversity jurisdiction was designed to “provide a separate forum for
out-of-state citizens against the prejudices of local courts and local juries by making
available to them the benefits and safeguards of Federal courts.” S. REP. NO. 85-1830,
at 4 (1958). Supreme Court precedent in this area has often sought to limit a
corporation’s ability to manufacture diversity and improperly remove cases to
federal court. The language of § 1408 serves not to protect debtors from local courts
and local juries, but to allow flexibility in choosing venue. The policy concerns
guiding these two sections have “little or nothing in common.” In re Commonwealth
Oil, 596 F.2d at 1247 n.17.
223 See In re W. Coast Interventional Pain Med., Inc., 435 B.R. 569, 575 n.2
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2010) (asserting Hertz’s nerve center approach to principal place
218
219
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for all intents and purposes, mandates the nerve center test in
evaluating a corporation’s principal place of business. This means
that corporate defendants have less flexibility in arguing diversity
under § 1332, and corporate debtors have slightly less flexibility in
attempting to justify their choice of venue under § 1408.
The inquiry under this basis is qualitative and, therefore, limits
forum shopping options. A corporate debtor could attempt to move
its headquarters and offices of its key decision-makers in
anticipation of a bankruptcy filing, but such an undertaking is
prohibitively disruptive for entities of any significance. Further, the
qualitative nature of the judicial inquiry as to this basis limits this
option. Consequently, in the United States, few debtors attempt to
alter their principal place of business in order to forum shop.224
ii.

Principal Assets

The term “assets” is undefined in the Bankruptcy Code but has
been interpreted broadly 225 to include not only manufacturing
facilities, inventory, and equipment, but also rights under a lease or
sublease, shares of stock, accounts receivable, net operating losses,
and pending lawsuits, inter alia.226 In evaluating this basis for venue,
courts consider the geographic location of the assets that are
principally used in the operation of the debtor’s business.227 To be
considered, the assets must be related to business in which the

of business for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction also applies in bankruptcy
cases); In re Lakota Canyon Ranch Dev., LLC., No. 11-03739-8-RDD, 2011 WL
5909630, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 21, 2011) (citing the Hertz ruling and adopting
the nerve center test in determining principal place of business), as amended (June
23, 2011).
224 See Parikh, supra note 22, at 179.
225 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012) (defining property of the estate as “all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”).
226 See In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 928 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (including
net operating losses as part of bankruptcy property); In re Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt Publ’g Co., 474 B.R. 122, 135-36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (including rights
under a lease as bankruptcy assets); In re J & L Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 186 B.R.
388, 392 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (including accounts receivable as bankruptcy assets).
227 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 192, at 19 (arguing companies move
their headquarters in order to obtain a favorable venue).
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debtor is engaged.228 Bankruptcy courts will generally engage in a
quantitative and qualitative analysis. 229 A quantitative analysis
requires that a court consider the dollar value of the assets in relation
to value of the debtor’s overall portfolio of assets.230 A qualitative
analysis requires that a court consider the importance of the assets
to the debtor’s operations and reorganization prospects.231 Only one
district can qualify as the place where a company’s principal assets
are located.232 Therefore, the bankruptcy courts will often have to
compare the assets located in one district with those located in
another.233
Not coincidentally, this criterion also tends to be the one that is
the most difficult to manipulate. Large corporations invariably have
assets located in a variety of districts; moving or selling a portion of
these assets in order to establish venue in a given district could be
difficult and unnecessary considering the other bases available for
forum shopping. That being said, because of the broad reading of
the term “assets,” this basis affords corporations with less fixed
assets significant flexibility. For example, a corporation that owns
limited assets, of which cash or cash equivalents are a primary part,
could simply transfer cash into a bank account located in the desired
jurisdiction prior to filing for bankruptcy.

228 See In re Newport Creamery, Inc., 265 B.R. 614, 616 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001)
(stating that either a corporation’s principal place of business or its principal assets
may be used to establish proper venue).
229 See, e.g., In re Houghton Mifflin, 474 B.R. at 136 (using both quantitative and
qualitative analyses).
230 See id. at 135-36 (emphasizing the importance of properly identifying a
debtor company’s principal assets to allow for a useful numerical comparison with
the company’s overall assets).
231 Id. at 136.
232 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 192, at 17 (stating a debtor can only
have one principal place of business at any given time).
233 See In re Houghton Mifflin, 474 B.R. at 136 (determining whether venue was
appropriate by comparing the assets of the holding company to those of its
subsidiaries that were within different districts).
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iii. Place of Incorporation / Registered Office
A corporate debtor’s place of incorporation—known as the
“registered office” in the EU 234 —represents a venue basis that is
frequently used to facilitate tourism.
Section 1408 of Title 28 provides that a “person” can rely on
domicile or residence in selecting venue.235 Section 1 of Title 1 of the
U.S. Code defines the term “person” to include natural persons as
well as fictitious business entities, such as partnerships and
corporations.236 A natural person can clearly have a domicile and a
residence. “Residence” is generally where someone is living. 237
“Domicile” is generally understood to refer to the place where one
resides coupled with the intention to remain; the term can also refer
to the place where one intends to return.238
However, § 1408’s language indicates that these terms can also
conceivably apply to a corporate debtor.239 Though it is unclear how
a corporation could have a “domicile” or “residence” aside from its
corporate headquarters or location of principal assets, many courts
assume that a corporation’s domicile is its state of incorporation.240
In these jurisdictions, corporate debtors have immense flexibility. A
corporation’s state of incorporation can be changed relatively

See MOSS, FLETCHER & ISAACS, supra note 45.
11 U.S.C. § 1408.
236 See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“[T]he words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies,
as well as individuals.”).
237
See Parikh, supra note 22, at 184.
238
In re Donald, 328 B.R. 192, 202 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
239
28 U.S.C. § 1408.
240 See, e.g., In re Dunmore Homes, Inc., 380 B.R. 663, 670 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(stating a corporation’s domicile is its state of incorporation); In re Innovative
Commc’n Co., 358 B.R. 120, 125 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (“Venue is appropriate in the
state of incorporation”); In re FRG, Inc., 107 B.R. 461, 471 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(“[A] corporation’s domicile is generally held to be its state of incorporation.”); In
re Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 96 B.R. 467, 467 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988) (finding Delaware
to be a proper venue since the debtor was incorporated in that state); In re EB Capital
Mgmt., No. 11-12646(MG), 2011 WL 2838115, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011)
(“A corporation’s domicile is generally held to be its state of incorporation.”).
234
235

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/5

2020]

The Cathedral in Another Light

249

easily.241 Changing a corporation’s state of incorporation to secure
venue may be worthwhile in cases involving a limited number of
high-stakes issues in which the court before which the bankruptcy
case is tried may be dispositive. Furthermore, a corporate debtor is
generally seen as having the right to file in any district located
within its state of incorporation. 242 Consequently, this basis for
venue is allowing forum shopping not only among states but also
among districts within the same state.
The only real constraint on a corporate debtor relying on its state
of incorporation is that it must have been incorporated in the state
of its bankruptcy case for the 180 days immediately preceding its
filing or, in the alternative, the longer portion of such a period.243
But considering that the vast majority of Megacases involve months
and sometimes years of pre-bankruptcy negotiations, the 180-day
look-back period poses a minor obstacle. Indeed, in my 2012 study,
one-third of the corporate debtors in the study group relied on this
basis in establishing venue, and all fifty-three forum shopped. 244
Further, these fifty-three forum shoppers represent almost half of
the total number of forum shoppers in my study group.
iv. Affiliate Filing
The final basis for a corporate debtor’s venue choice is that one
of the debtor’s “affiliates” has a pending case in the district.245
241 See, e.g., Alison Torbitt, Implementing Corporate Climate Change Responsibility:
Possible State Legislative and SEC Responses to Climate Change Through Corporate Law
Reform, 88 OR. L. REV. 581, 595 (2009) (stating a business can easily change its state
of incorporation).
242
See Parikh, supra note 22, at 186.
243
See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1).
244
Parikh, supra note 22, at 185.
245 See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (stating that a title 11 case can be brought in a district
“in which there is a pending case under title 11 concerning such person’s affiliate”).
Though not technically binding, § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code defines the term
“affiliate” to mean:

(A) entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power
to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the
debtor, other than an entity that holds such securities—(i) in a fiduciary
or agency capacity without sole discretionary power to vote such
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Surprisingly, this venue basis was traditionally one of the least
controversial provisions of the venue rules. Without this basis for
venue, various companies within the same corporate family could
be forced to file for bankruptcy in different districts. A wholesale
adjudication of the corporate family’s bankruptcy cases would be
virtually impossible. There would be considerable waste of judicial
resources, not to mention the financial and logistical burden on the
debtor’s officers and legal counsel. The net result would be a
significant reduction in any chance of a meaningful reorganization.
Notwithstanding this sound policy, the wording of § 1408(2)
provides virtually no restrictions on an affiliate filing, and this has
allowed for debtor gamesmanship.
Today, § 1408(2) is used in a manner that bears no relation to the
policy basis of the provision. The most common method for abusing
this provision is for the corporate debtor to locate a subsidiary that
had been incorporated in a favorable district—a district in which the
primary corporate debtor could not otherwise file its bankruptcy
petition. Legal counsel for the corporate debtor prepares the entire
corporate family for bankruptcy. But instead of filing the entire
family together, legal counsel files the subsidiary’s petition in the
favorable district first to establish venue. Then, within a matter of
minutes, the rest of the corporate family files their bankruptcy
petitions in the same district on the premise that an affiliate’s
bankruptcy case is pending in the district.

securities; or (ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has not in fact
exercised such power to vote; (B) corporation 20 percent or more of whose
outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled,
or held with power to vote, by the debtor, or by an entity that directly or
indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more
of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than an entity that
holds such securities—(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole
discretionary power to vote such securities; or (ii) solely to secure a debt,
if such entity has not in fact exercised such power to vote; (C) person
whose business is operated under a lease or operating agreement by a
debtor, or person substantially all of whose property is operated under an
operating agreement with the debtor; or (D) entity that operates the
business or substantially all of the property of the debtor under a lease or
operating agreement.
11 U.S.C. § 101(2). However, this definition is not binding on United States
bankruptcy judges because it is limited to sections within Title 11 of the U.S. Code,
and venue matters are addressed in Title 28.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/5

2020]

The Cathedral in Another Light

251

Debtor gamesmanship can come in other permutations. In some
cases, a corporate family has no subsidiaries that are able to file in
the desired district. This is a rare circumstance but one that is easily
circumvented because of the permissive language of § 1408(2). In
such a case, the company merely creates and incorporates a shell
subsidiary in the favorable district and then follows the procedure
outlined above. The shell subsidiary has no employees or
meaningful operations or assets, but the fact that it is incorporated
in the favorable district is sufficient—even when the incorporation
occurs in the days immediately before the bankruptcy filing.246 For
example, in 2005, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., filed for bankruptcy in the
The corporation was
Southern District of New York. 247
headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, and had no connection to
New York.248 The debtor was able to manufacture venue for the case
by incorporating a subsidiary in New York twelve days prior to the
filing and invoking the so-called “affiliate rule.”249
This basis and the state-of-incorporation basis work together to
facilitate forum shopping. Forty-five of the 159 corporate debtors in
my 2012 study group (28%) relied on the affiliate filing hook. 250
246
Debtors have attempted to use this technique in many instances. See In re
Dunmore Homes, Inc., 380 B.R. 663, 667 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining debtor’s
only connection to New York was its incorporation in the state on the eve of
bankruptcy); United States Trustee’s Omnibus Reply to Objections to United States
Trustee’s Motion, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1412 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014(a), to
Transfer Venue of These Cases in the Interest of Justice at 6–7, In re Patriot Coal
Corp., 482 B.R. 718 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2012) (No. 12-12900) (arguing that the
debtors’ chief financial officer essentially admitted to incorporating two affiliates in
the weeks before the bankruptcy filing for the sole purpose of establishing venue in
the Southern District of New York); Motion of Buffalo Rock Company to Transfer
Venue of the Debtors’ Bankruptcy Cases to the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division or Such Other District Where
Venue Would Be Appropriate Under 28 U.S.C. § 1408 at 1, In re Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc., No. 05-11063 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Buffalo Rock]
(explaining that debtor had incorporated an affiliate just twelve days before the
bankruptcy filing in order to secure venue in the Southern District of New York).
But see Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee’s Motion,
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1412 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014(a)(1), to Transfer Venue of
These Cases in the Interest of Justice at 43-53, In re Patriot Coal, 482 B.R. 718 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.) (No. 12-12900) (arguing that case should not be transferred pursuant to
the court’s rationale in In re Winn-Dixie).
247
Buffalo Rock, supra note 246.
248 Id. at 11.
249 Id. at 1.
250 Parikh, supra note 22, at 190-91.
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Forty-four of those forty-five debtors forum shopped.251 Further, 40%
of the forum shoppers in my study group relied on this basis.252
b. Assessing Bankruptcy Tourism
Tourism’s prevalence in the U.S. bankruptcy process is
undisputed. However, despite the consistent use of the phrase as a
pejorative, the phenomenon’s effect on the bankruptcy process is
unclear.
Bankruptcy scholars have advanced a number of
theoretical arguments that support eliminating the practice,253 three
of which are particularly applicable here.
Primarily, bankruptcy tourism can undermine judicial
legitimacy and the perception of a restructuring system’s integrity.
The process appears subject to manipulation when high-profile
restructuring cases repeatedly flee to specific courts. In other words,
certain courts appear willing to give corporate debtors and other key
decision makers the outcomes they seek. This perception erodes
public confidence in the court system and affects creditors,
employees, unions, and other constituents excluded from the
perceived backroom dealings. Many stakeholders face limited
visibility into restructuring proceedings when those proceedings
occur in jurisdictions far removed from a debtor’s central
administration. Without transparency, a restructuring system’s
fairness can be called into question. Judiciaries strive to ensure that
similarly situated parties receive similar treatment.254 Bankruptcy
tourism may lead to greater discrepancies in substantive laws,
which may fuel disparate treatment.
Further, an elevated level of bankruptcy tourism may produce
suboptimal laws and legal interpretations. Tourism can incentivize
government legislators to enact overly permissive “debtor-friendly”

251
252
253
254

(1921).

Id. at 191.
Id.
See id. at 192-98; see also sources cited supra note 192.
See, e.g., Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature Of The Judicial Process 33-34
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laws in order to lure companies to their jurisdiction.255 These laws
create an imbalance in the restructuring process that favors debtors
and insiders in the short-term, but could decimate stakeholder value
over the long-term. 256 As a corollary, judges in a particular
jurisdiction may hold similar objectives and interpret existing laws
in a way that is similarly advantageous to debtors and insiders but
ultimately harmful to creditors and other stakeholders. 257 These
dynamics cause a few select courts to be oversubscribed. With
permissive venue rules, corporate debtors are able to methodically
select courts that rule in ways that further debtor objectives—which
can be diametrically opposed to stakeholder objectives. The favored
courts gain the power to dictate the interpretation of key provisions
because other courts are rarely asked to adjudicate these matters.
Ultimately, corporate tourists endorse certain courts’ adjudication of
key restructuring issues and, in many cases, are voicing their
disapproval of how other courts have resolved—or are expected to
resolve—such issues. But the interpretations by the favored courts
may be too debtor-friendly and ultimately suppress creditor
recoveries and undermine rehabilitation prospects.
Without
discourse across courts, these inaccuracies remain unchallenged and
may be strengthened by repeated application to a canon of cases.
255 See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 182, at 434. In the shadow of Brexit, the
Dutch government enacted the Modernization Bankruptcy Procedure Act, which
offers a more efficient and faster restructuring process that may lure companies
unable or unwilling to rely on the English courts in upcoming years. See Reforms to
Dutch Bankruptcy Act Take In Force from 1 January 2019, OSBORNE CLARK (Nov. 16,
2018), https://www.osborneclarke.com/insights/reforms-to-dutch-bankruptcyact-take-in-force-from-1-january-2019/ [https://perma.cc/2VKU-FTBC].
256
For example, a government may ease the requirements for a court to
approve a plan of reorganization when multiple classes of creditors object to the
plan. This benefits a company that is focused on a reorganization. However, the
permissive review could enable the confirmation of a plan that has fundamental
defects that increase recidivism risk—the fear that the company will stumble back
into bankruptcy within a relatively short period of time—which ultimately wastes
resources and destroys value. See Parikh, supra note 22, at 192-98.
257
See VENUE REPORT, supra note 39, at 33-34. For example, a “debtor-friendly”
judge may refuse to allow an insolvency practitioner to investigate alleged
malfeasance and embezzlement committed by management, insiders, and senior
lenders. The judge may not want her court to have the reputation of allowing these
parties—who have significant input in the location of a restructuring proceeding—
to face potentially frivolous investigations. However, the decision to protect these
parties may preclude the company from recovering funds essential to a successful
restructuring, forcing the company to liquidate to the detriment of all other
stakeholders. See Parikh, supra note 22, at 192-98.
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When a company files a restructuring proceeding in a
jurisdiction far from its COMI, officials from the government of its
central administration, as well as many of its creditors and
employees, may be prohibited from participating meaningfully in
the case. This disenfranchisement can exclude key stakeholders
from a process that most directly impacts them. The result may be
inequitable as key stakeholders are subject to dramatic alterations in
their rights and benefits but are unable to participate in the process
that brings about these effects. Further, regulations and substantive
laws from a tourist debtor’s home country may be ignored or fail to
be properly implemented by the host court for a tourist’s
restructuring proceeding.258
c. Is Bankruptcy Tourism Deleterious?
EU Restructuring Law and, in particular, the Recast EIR
aggressively restrict bankruptcy tourism for the reasons delineated
above, among others.259 This posture is premised in large part on
objections formulated by bankruptcy scholars and policymakers.260
The fact that these objections are primarily theoretical is extremely
revealing. The United States has been in the midst of a 30-year
golden age of bankruptcy tourism.
If widespread tourism
undermines bankruptcy systems and produces suboptimal results
for creditors and stakeholders, the phenomenon’s deleterious effects
should be apparent empirically. But there is no empirical research
supporting these criticisms.261
258
Some scholars have also argued that case pooling in just a few courts is
inefficient. Judges in oversubscribed jurisdictions are overburdened while judges
in other courts are underutilized. Further, tourism may create an economic
deprivation for certain locales. Large bankruptcy cases create work for local
attorneys and fuel dining and hospitality businesses. When large corporations
engage in tourism, local communities are deprived of significant revenue. See
VENUE REPORT, supra note 29, at 50-58 (“Based upon estimates from Bloomberg
Businessweek, the flood of companies fleeing their home jurisdictions over the past
13 years has drained nearly $4 billion from local economies.”).
259
See Part IV.b, supra.
260
See id.
261
Professor Lynn M. LoPucki has come the closest to successfully
condemning tourism empirically. In The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in
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The lack of identifiable consequences raises an interesting
question: could bankruptcy tourism be superlative? Indeed, the
practice is a long-standing fixture of the preeminent bankruptcy
system in the world.262 The U.S. bankruptcy system is described as
“the model to which European restructuring laws should aspire.”263
How can a central feature of this bankruptcy system be deleterious?
At some point, I believe that a study can be designed to empirically
test this question. I will not attempt to speculate on the structure of
such a study or what the results will indicate. However, it would be
indefensible for bankruptcy scholars to refuse to consider that such
a study may establish that controlled 264 bankruptcy tourism—the
phrase I use to describe the type of tourism apparent in the United
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”, 54 VAND. L. REV.
231 (2001), Professor LoPucki—along with Sara D. Kalin—established that from
1983 to 1996, the refiling rates for companies that had matriculated through the
Delaware bankruptcy courts were significantly higher than for all other bankruptcy
courts. LoPucki and Kalin argued that the abnormally high recidivism rates were
the product of Delaware courts being too “lax” in their standards for approving
plan confirmation—ordering relief and confirming plans that they knew were
inappropriate—and the consequence of a blatant design to encourage forum
shopping to their courts. Though the findings were quite noteworthy at the time,
the data for filings in the following decade established that the recidivism rate
regressed to align with national averages. But see Ruth Sarah Lee, Delaware’s
Relevance in Chapter 22: Who is “Courting Failure” Now?, 31 REV. BANK. & FIN. L. 443,
468-73 (2011) (establishing that from 1997 to 2004, Delaware cases had similar
failure rates as non-Delaware cases); see also Stephen J. Lubben, Delaware’s
Irrelevance, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 267, 271-72, 279 (2008) (finding that there
was no “statistically significant difference in refiling rates” for cases in or outside
Delaware based on data of public companies with more than $100 million in assets
who filed bankruptcy cases between 1992 and 2002).
262 See DOING BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 29.
263 See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 219.
264
I describe the brand of tourism found in the United States as “controlled”
because—despite the latitude distressed corporations enjoy in selecting a
bankruptcy forum—a bankruptcy court enjoys full discretion to transfer a case to
another court if the filing is improper or if transfer serves “the interest of justice
or . . . the convenience of the parties [in the case].” FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a)(2); 28
U.S.C. § 1412. Courts regularly use this transfer power as a check on aggressive
forum shopping. See In re Caesars Ent. Operating Co., No. 15-10047, 2015 WL
495259 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 2, 2015) (holding case originally filed in Delaware
bankruptcy court to be transferred to bankruptcy court in the Northern District of
Illinois); In re Patriot Coal Corp., 482 B.R. 718 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding case
originally filed in the Southern District of New York bankruptcy court to be
transferred to bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of Missouri); see also Harvey
R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1987, 1995-96 (2002).
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States—is a necessary component of an efficient and effective
bankruptcy system. If true, the EU’s attempt to eliminate the
practice may in fact undermine its economic objectives. Further,
even if bankruptcy tourism is not superlative, facilitating the
practice may represent the most efficient means within the EU’s
arsenal to address the two primary intractable problems embedded
in its restructuring framework. In other words, tourism may be a
necessary evil due to the unique vagaries of the EU restructuring
framework. By aggressively policing abusive tourism, the EU is also
restricting controlled tourism.
In the following section, I detail how the EU can address
structural and legal obstacles by facilitating bankruptcy tourism.
V. THE CATHEDRAL IN ANOTHER LIGHT: FACILITATING
CONTROLLED TOURISM IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE EU’S
INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS
Previous sections explored the European Union’s economic
policy objectives and how its corporate restructuring framework is
being modified to advance these objectives. Despite these changes,
the framework is plagued by two intractable problems undermining
its economic policy objectives: 1) significant divergence of
substantive restructuring law across Member States; and 2) lack of
restructuring experience in the judiciary. Few scholars have
attempted to formulate an optimal means to address these issues.
In the following section, I argue that there is a low likelihood that
Member States will modify substantive law to a degree necessary to
afford any semblance of certainty for parties drawn into complex
restructuring matters. In other words, I argue that the idea of
impending harmonization is a myth, and the same bleak outlook
applies to the possibility of meaningful judicial training as to
fundamental restructuring concepts.
Consequently, I urge the EU to embrace the next best alternative:
facilitating controlled bankruptcy tourism in order to allow for the
creation of judicial hubs with optimal law and experienced jurists.
The following section explains why the increased prevalence of
bankruptcy tourism may be particularly appealing in the EU.
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a. The Laboratory Theory and Advancing Restructuring Laws Through
Tourism
As noted above, the harmonization quandary is well known, but
the ability to address the problem in a meaningful way is elusive.
The EU works through recommendations and directives in order to
encourage Member States to make substantive changes to national
law.265 However, these urgings have been met with inaction.266 And
there is significant variance in substantive restructuring law across
Member States.267 The likelihood of any semblance of uniformity in
the foreseeable future—even as to basic restructuring provisions—
is abysmal. This is a key distinguishing feature between the EU and
U.S. bankruptcy systems. The U.S. system is built on one legal code
and implemented through courts within one federal judiciary
system. Certainly, incongruence does exist across different regional
circuit courts in the United States, but the range of variance on
substantive legal issues does not materially undermine creditor risk
assessment or recoveries.268
The disparity between the EU and U.S. bankruptcy systems may
justify the EU embracing controlled tourism. Indeed, it is unlikely
that a harmonized restructuring system promulgating optimal
law—as defined by the EU itself—will be available to EU companies
in most Member States. But the laboratory theory offers a path
forward.
The laboratory theory, most succinctly described by Justice
Brandeis’ dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,269 provides that
states within the U.S. federal system represent laboratories and may
choose to develop innovative statutory approaches to social and
economic problems.270 To the extent that an approach proves to be
optimal, other states and even the federal government may adopt
the approach and standardize it. The EU could choose to embrace
this theory and afford Member States freedom to explore distinctive
265
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 171-72.
266 See Eidenmüller, supra note 38, at 3-4.
267 See Section III.a, supra.
268 See generally VENUE REPORT, supra note 39.
269
285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932).
270 Id. at 82.
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restructuring laws. Other scholars have already noted this
possibility, 271 but what the current literature overlooks is that
tourism accelerates the laboratory theory’s effect in a restructuring
marketplace.272
Imagine an alternative regulatory environment in the EU more
akin to what exists in the United States. A progressive Member
State—Luxembourg, for example—determines that attracting
corporate bankruptcy cases from outside its borders can be
extremely beneficial to its local economy. As a result, this Member
State enacts a more effective and predictable restructuring system,
including changes to substantive law and procedure.273 As a critical
271
See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., What’s So Bad About Delaware? 54 VAND. L. REV.
309, 314 (2001).
272
I acknowledge that the prevalent practice in the EU over the last few years
is to file for bankruptcy only the financial holding company of a corporate family,
keeping subsidiaries out of the process and effectuating a deleveraging by relying
on applicable intercreditor agreements. However, these types of restructuring
cases fail to address many key operational and structural issues, representing half
measures that will not be as prevalent as the current economic correction evolves.
For example, the finance holding company of a distressed apparel retailer may be
able to rely on a restructuring proceeding to gain lender accommodations that allow
it to avoid a payment default and improve liquidity, but the retailer will not be able
to actually reject commercial leases or make other fundamental changes essential to
improving its operations unless it includes its operating subsidiaries in the
restructuring process. Without that, the restructuring is one-dimensional and fails
to secure many of the benefits that make Chapter 11 proceedings in the US
transformative. Further, Article 7 of the Recast EIR provides that the national law
of the country hosting the main restructuring proceeding is dispositive as to a
number of key issues, including the claims process, the respective powers of the
debtor and restructuring practitioner, contract rejection, and avoidance actions,
inter alia. See Recast EIR, supra note 122, at art. 7. Consequently, imagine a distressed
corporate family considering a restructuring proceeding in order to clean up its
capital structure but also to renegotiate with commercial landlords across the EU
and attack a disastrous leveraged buyout that occurred 3 years ago. The national
law of the country in which the main proceeding is opened will be extremely
important. In this case—and others like it—the ability to forum shop by changing
a registered office would be extremely valuable, at the very least, because Member
States have divergent statutes of limitation on fraudulent transfer actions, as well
as different criteria in order to establish a claim. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 182,
at 434. Ultimately, there are cases where a COMI shift based on registered office
will be the only option because the central administration and assets of the key
entity cannot be timely moved. My proposals merely put more jurisdictional
options on the table in order to afford debtors flexibility.
273
Many jurisdictions seek to attract corporate bankruptcy filings in order to
boost local economies and professional industries. See Singapore Enacts New
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mass of companies—including ones from outside the borders of this
Member State—secures the benefits of this system, creditor
recoveries improve and more financially viable companies are able
to successfully reorganize. The migration may also encourage other
countries to reform their restructuring laws, further enhancing
recoveries. 274 Even distressed companies located outside of the
progressive Member State are able to rely on more predictable
creditor outcomes and initiate meaningful out-of-court negotiations
with this baseline. As outcomes improve, borrowing costs decline
and credit is more accessible. The possibility of forum shopping
encourages corporate managers to initiate restructuring discussions
at an earlier stage of deterioration in order to secure a venue in a
desirable jurisdiction. More importantly, accelerating restructuring
negotiations improves in-court and out-of-court restructuring
outcomes and—in some cases—may entirely negate the need for a
restructuring filing.
b. Forum Shopping Can Help Address Experience Deficiencies in the
Judiciary
With limited exceptions, judges overseeing restructuring cases
in Member States are not specialists.275 Further, the few judges who
Corporate Bankruptcy Law in Bid to Become Center for International Debt Restructuring,
JONES
DAY
(May/June
2017),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2017/05/singapore-enacts-new-corpor
ate-bankruptcy-law-in-bid-to-become-center-for-international-debt-restructuring
[https://perma.cc/K39T-4GBM]; see also McCormack & Wan, supra note 29, at 97
(explaining that Singapore’s recent reforms to its restructuring laws are a blatant
attempt to encourage international companies to locate their restructuring cases in
Singapore); VENUE REPORT, supra note 39, at 56 (“Based upon estimates from
Bloomberg Businessweek, the flood of companies fleeing their home jurisdictions
over the past 13 years has drained nearly $4 billion from local economies.”).
274
For example, in 2011 bankruptcy tourism by German companies prompted
reform of Germany’s restructuring laws. See Regierungsentwurf [Cabinet Draft],
Deutscher
Bundestag:
Drucksachen
[BT]
17/5712,
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/057/1705712.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YTH-Y763] (Ger.) (noting that companies relocated their head
office to England because of the perception that restructuring the company under
English law appeared to be more advantageous; this phenomenon highlighted
weaknesses in German law).
275 See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 94.
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do regularly oversee restructuring cases invariably lack a
comprehensive understanding of restructuring concepts because
almost all cases in their courts are liquidation proceedings or asset
sales.276
As noted above, the EU acknowledges that a lack of experience
across the judiciary compromises the bankruptcy system, which
undermines the EU’s economic policy objectives. Controlled forum
shopping would afford a subset of the EU judiciary repeated
exposure to complex restructuring cases (the “EU Magnet Judges”).
The United States has witnessed this with the bankruptcy courts in
New York and Delaware.277 Controlled tourism has allowed judges
in these courts to review a significant volume of complex
restructuring cases, facilitating familiarity and expertise with hypertechnical issues that could overwhelm judges in other districts.278
The development of these judicial hubs in the EU would instill
valuable experience that cannot be replicated through EU training
mandates. This is arguably the optimal scenario for the EU because,
as noted above, the prospect of developing an experienced
restructuring judiciary across the EU is unlikely.
c. Creating Judicial Hubs to Address Intractable Legal and Structural
Problems
To the extent that (i) harmonization of substantive restructuring
laws; and (ii) an experienced judiciary to implement these laws are
both unlikely to materialize across Member States in the foreseeable
future, the judicial-hub model described above offers the EU a way
to possibly address its intractable legal and structural problems.
Over time, tourism supports the development of hubs for
optimal restructuring laws and experienced judges. Countries
wishing to host these hubs may be more inclined to adopt EU
restructuring policy suggestions. If successful, judges in these hubs
will repeatedly encounter meaningful restructuring issues and
develop a thoughtful approach to key, case-dispositive issues. As
detailed in Part II.a., predictability allows companies and creditors
276
277
278

See Eidenmüller, supra note 38, at 22-23.
See VENUE REPORT, supra note 39, at 74-76.
See id.
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to formulate a range of in-court restructuring outcomes with a high
degree of certainty. This data informs and facilitates out-of-court
restructuring negotiations and improves outcomes. Experienced
judges also accelerate case speed, which increases the likelihood of
a successful restructuring while also lowering process costs. 279
These framework dynamics could allow the EU to enjoy the benefits
of the virtuous cycle without actually addressing key legal and
structural deficiencies.
In the following section, based on the possibility that controlled
bankruptcy tourism may allow the EU to further its economic policy
objectives, I propose legislative changes that will encourage the
potentially beneficial aspects of tourism but avoid negative
externalities that the practice can create.
VI. EU RESTRUCTURING LAW IN A NEW LIGHT
The previous sections detail my novel assessment that controlled
bankruptcy tourism may be necessary in the short term to fulfill the
EU’s economic policy objectives. This section proposes legislative
changes to the Recast EIR that will thoughtfully promote the practice
but minimize the risk of destructive jurisdictional arbitrage.
a. COMI and Incorporation Theory: Offering Debtors Options and
Certainty
A debtor’s COMI guides the venue decision in the EU. COMI is
described as “the place where the debtor conducts the
administration of its interests on a regular basis and is therefore
ascertainable by third parties.”280 The COMI evaluation demands a
factually intensive, qualitative assessment. 281 The import of this
demand on the judiciary, debtors, and creditors appears to be
softened by the presumption that the location of a debtor’s

279
280
281

See id.
Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 3 (EC).
See Section II.b.iii., supra.
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registered office establishes COMI.282 However, the Recast EIR and
CJEU case law make clear that this presumption is a weak one.283
Various recitals in the Recast EIR emphasize that the genesis for the
registered office presumption was the impression that a
corporation’s central administration would invariably be located in
the country of its registered office. 284 This premise cannot be
reconciled with the structure of modern multi-national
corporations.
All dimensions of the modern corporation are designed to
optimize operations and revenue, while limiting potential exposure.
For example, a corporation’s registered office may have been
selected to take advantage of favorable laws, but its central
administration may be located in a different country due to various
operational and business reasons. Freedom of establishment allows
EU corporations to migrate within the single market. 285 To the
extent that controlled bankruptcy tourism is proven advantageous,
then EU Restructuring Law should be revised to align with crossborder conversion doctrine and tolerate this migration.286
Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 3 (EC).
See Sections II.b.iii & II.b.iv, supra.
284 See Section II.b.iv, supra.
285
In Polbud, the CJEU recognized isolated cross-border conversions—
commonly understood to encompass a company migrating its registered office to a
new Member State without shifting any of its economic activity—as falling within
the freedom of establishment’s scope. Case C-106/16, Polbud—Wykonawstwo sp.
z o.o., 2017 (Sup. Ct. Pol.), para. 62-63. Member States are entitled to restrict this
type of migration if they constitute entirely artificial arrangements designed to
circumvent national legislation. However, “the mere fact that a company wished
to select the most beneficial legal system . . . does not in itself empower Member
States to adopt restrictive measures in order to fight abuses.” See Ariel Mucha &
Krzysztof Oplustil, Redefining the Freedom of Establishment under EU Law as the
Freedom to Choose the Applicable Company Law: A Discussion After the Judgment of the
Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 25 October 2017 in Case C-106/16, Polbud, 15 EUR.
CO. & FIN. L. REV. No. 2, 270, 298 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3100156
[https://perma.cc/TA5F-DRM9].
286
Some commentators have argued that any attempt to restrict bankruptcy
tourism may violate the freedom of establishment. See generally Wolf-Georg Ringe,
Forum Shopping under the EU Insolvency Regulation 25-27 (Univ. of Oxford Legal
Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 33/2008, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1209822
[https://perma.cc/9W53-REYZ] (questioning the negative attitude towards forum
shopping and suggesting that the current regime be modified to take advantage of
beneficial forum shopping). But see Eidenmüeller, supra note 38, at 12 n.34 (“Ringe
does not sufficiently take into account the protection of workers and creditors in
282
283
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The primary revision is to amend the Recast EIR’s
conceptualization of venue and registered office. A corporation’s
registered office in a particular Member State should be sufficient to
establish venue.287 The only exception to this strong presumption
should be if the registered office was relocated to another Member
State within the three-month period prior to the case opening. 288
The change would afford corporations flexibility while offering
enhanced certainty to all stakeholders, easing the risk of excessive
forum shopping, 289 and reducing the burden on the judiciary.
Judges would no longer undertake the elaborate, real-seat inquiry
as to “all the places in which the debtor company pursues economic
activities and all those in which it holds assets”290—an inquiry that
is further complicated by the requirement that the court speculate as
to what is actually ascertainable by third parties. The simplified
process avoids draining judicial and stakeholder resources and
improves case efficiency.
Further, Article 3 of the Recast EIR should be amended to
provide that a debtor may rely on any of the following bases in order
to establish that its COMI is located in a particular jurisdiction: (i)
the debtor has its registered office in the chosen Member State; (ii)
the debtor’s central administration is located in the chosen Member
State; (iii) the debtor’s principal assets are located in the chosen
Member State; or (iv) there is a pending restructuring or insolvency

interpreting freedom of establishment and its reach. I agree that abuse of law can
only be established on a case by case basis according to the ECJ. However, Member
States are entitled to pass general laws in order to protect imperative requirements
in the public interest.”) (citation omitted).
287
As noted above, I acknowledge that the prevalent practice in the EU over
the last few years is to file for bankruptcy only the financial holding company of a
corporate family, keeping subsidiaries out of the process and effectuating a
deleveraging by relying on applicable intercreditor agreements. However, these
types of restructuring cases fail to address many key operational and structural
issues, representing a half measure that will not be prevalent as the current
economic correction evolves.
288
This maintains the existing restriction found in the Recast EIR, Recital (40),
and reflects the fact that restructuring planning for EU companies rarely starts more
than six months before the commencement of a proceeding.
289
Naturally, regulatory arbitrage is an inveterate facet of bankruptcy tourism
that can be minimized to bolster creditor expectations and improve predictability.
290 Case C-396/09, Interedil Srl (in liq.) v. Fallimento Interedil Srl, 2012 E.C.R.
I-9939.
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case in that Member State concerning at least one of the debtor’s
corporate affiliates.291
Courts should continue to be required to confirm their
jurisdictional authority, but Article 4’s requirement that each court
must sua sponte evaluate the basis for venue292 should be amended
to explain that a comprehensive evaluation is only necessary if a
motion objecting to venue has been filed by a party in interest.
In order to support these changes, Recital (5) of the Recast EIR
should be amended to acknowledge that internal markets will not
function properly if regulatory incentives exist for parties to engage
in abusive or fraudulent bankruptcy tourism. 293 In order to
promulgate a more debtor-centric ethos, the import of Recital (28)
should be amended to eliminate the idea that special consideration
is given to creditors’ perception of where a debtor conducts the
administration of its interests. Recital (30)—which provides that the
location of a debtor’s central administration overrides the
presumption afforded in Article 3(1) 294 —should be eliminated
entirely.
I believe that these limited changes offer transformative results
and shift the EU restructuring system to one that is more debtorfocused, as opposed to creditor-focused. If implemented, EU
corporations would have far more latitude in determining venue
and more certainty regarding case-dispositive variables. However,
I acknowledge that bad faith actors can exploit this new freedom. In
the next section, I discuss means to mitigate the risk of abusive or
fraudulent forum shopping contaminating the system.

291
The EU will need to determine how to define “affiliate.” See supra note 245
(quoting definition of “affiliate” that appears in 11 U.S.C. § 101).
292
Recast EIR, supra note 122, art. 4.
293
The current version of the Recital targets all types of bankruptcy tourism.
294
Recast EIR, supra note 122.
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b. The Darkness of Governance Mismatch and the Need for Risk
Mitigation
One of the primary concerns with bankruptcy tourism is that
corporate insiders 295 will seek to locate a bankruptcy case in a
particular jurisdiction for an improper reason; not because the
jurisdiction will facilitate a successful restructuring but because the
judges or substantive law in that jurisdiction may allow the insiders
to avoid civil or criminal liability.
Quite simply, corporations are run to maximize shareholder
value. 296 Directors, senior officers, and other insiders—who are
invariably shareholders as well and receive variable compensation
based on company performance297—share in the prosperity of the
company for which they work. During times of corporate
profitability, these insiders are incentivized—even without internal
regulatory controls—to suppress self-interested conduct to the
extent that it creates a material risk of harm to their employer.
However, once a subject company becomes insolvent, it is often
disadvantageous for insiders to suppress their self-interested
conduct. There is a high likelihood that the insiders will no longer
want to continue their affiliation with the subject company. At the
same time, in many cases, these individuals could face criminal
actions or civil penalties if a financial restructuring exposes their
conduct to review by those with fiduciary obligations to a court or
creditor body. This dynamic creates what I describe as a
“governance mismatch.” In many cases, insiders attempt to steer a

295
The term “insider” generally refers to individuals or entities for whom
there is a heightened risk of information asymmetries or access to financial accounts
that can be exploited for gains at the expense of another corporate entity and its
stakeholders. In the United States, if the debtor is a corporation, an “insider” would
include a “(i) director of the debtor; (ii) officer of the debtor; (iii) person in control
of the debtor; (iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; (v) general
partner of the debtor; [and] (vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or
person in control of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B).
296 See JONATHAN MACEY, DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 372 (13th ed. 2017).
297
See id.
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distressed corporation into a particular jurisdiction in order to
escape scrutiny or at least limit their exposure.298
Bankruptcy tourism weaponizes governance mismatch.
Consequently, EU Restructuring Law would need to be amended to
specifically address cases where bad actors are fleeing to a particular
jurisdiction to obfuscate malfeasance or otherwise disadvantage
creditors for personal gain.
i.

Court Fiduciary with the Power to Investigate Malfeasance

Section 1104(c) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code authorizes judges to
appoint a fiduciary of the court—referred to as an examiner—to
conduct an investigation of the debtor, “including an investigation
of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct,
mismanagement, or irregularity.”299 The court determines the scope
and funding of this investigation. 300 However, the subsection
mandates the appointment if “(1) such appointment is in the
interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests
of the estate; or (2) the debtor’s fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts,
298
Some scholars believe that this dynamic emerged in the Enron bankruptcy
case. In that case, Enron’s management feared that the appointment of a chapter 11
trustee would uncover significant corporate malfeasance. See LoPucki, supra note
6, at 13-14. Enron’s management believed that if the bankruptcy case could be filed
in the Southern District of New York, a bankruptcy judge on that bench—as
opposed to one in the Houston bankruptcy court—would be disinclined to displace
Enron’s management team by such an appointment. See id. Indeed, the standard
for appointing a trustee in the circuit in which the S.D.N.Y. bankruptcy courts are
located was—and continues to be—much more difficult to satisfy than the standard
applicable to a bankruptcy court in Houston. See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113
B.R. 164, 168 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (requiring that a showing in support of an
appointment of a trustee must be made by clear and convincing evidence). Enron’s
management team was ultimately correct in their assessment. See LoPucki, supra
note 6, at 14-15 (“New York bankruptcy judge Arthur J. Gonzalez drew the Enron
case. . . . Several major creditors requested the appointment of a trustee. Gonzalez
delayed a hearing until he brokered a deal that left most of Enron’s management in
place . . . . [The] directors chosen by [Enron’s CEO] . . . remained in control of the
company through the crucial stages of the bankruptcy case. They resigned only
after they too had chosen their own successors. As a result, the [federal]
investigators remained on the outside . . . . For a management engaged in massive
fraud, it was the best bankruptcy result for which one could hope.”).
299
11 U.S.C. 1104(c).
300
See id.
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other than debts for goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider,
exceed $5,000,000.”301
Almost all Member States rely on the restructuring
practitioner302 (“RP”) model, requiring the appointment of an RP at
the time a restructuring case is filed.303 In some countries, the RP
merely assumes an oversight role304 but in others the RP takes over
some or all management authority.305 Invariably, the RP is focused
on how the business is being run during the restructuring
proceeding and ways to facilitate a successful reorganization to
improve creditor recoveries.306 Some RPs consider the events that
precipitated the bankruptcy filing, 307 but that is a secondary or
tertiary issue.308
The Restructuring Directive attempts to move Member States
towards the U.S. debtor-in-possession model. Article 5 requires
Member States to “ensure that debtors accessing preventive
restructuring procedures remain totally or at least partially in
control of their assets and day-to-day operation of the business.”309
Further, “appointment . . . of a [restructuring practitioner] shall not
be mandatory in every case.”310 The Restructuring Directive’s shift
301 Id. In the vast majority of cases, appointment of an examiner is not in the
interest of stakeholders or the estate because there is no indication of malfeasance
from which the estate can make a financial recovery, or the cost of the examiner
would eclipse any potential recovery. However, the second basis for appointment
(the “$5 Million Threshold”) is satisfied in virtually all Megacases. Nevertheless,
notwithstanding the subsection’s language, courts that do not believe the
appointment of an examiner is appropriate will engage in a number of practices to
contravene the subsection, including refusing to hear an appointment motion or
providing an examiner with an extremely limited budget and scope.
302
Historically, these individuals were referred to as “insolvency
practitioners,” but the Restructuring Directive changed that nomenclature. See
Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at Article 2(15). This Article uses the new
terminology.
303 See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 256-58.
304
See id. For example, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, and Sweden. See id.
305
See id. For example, Malta, Ireland, and Poland. See id.
306 See id. at 77-80.
307
See id. at 257. For example, Italian RPs attempt to establish the cause of the
debtor’s financial difficulties. Id.
308 See id. at 256-58.
309 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at art. 5(1).
310 See id. at art. 5(2). Article 18 is relevant in this context because it requires
Member States to enact national laws that impose various fiduciary duties on
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to a more accommodating governance model may ultimately
increase the risk of abusive or fraudulent tourism. The directive
affords existing management more autonomy, and the appointment
of RPs is encouraged in only two extremely specific instances,
neither of which involves insider malfeasance.311 As noted above, in
the vast majority of Member States, RPs are afforded broad powers
but exploring malfeasance is not a point of emphasis. 312 Indeed,
many RPs’ primary task is to achieve a successful outcome in the
restructuring case and work with existing management to do so. I
argue that it is misguided to expect a party with these
responsibilities to also take the lead in investigating management’s
pre-filing conduct to identify malfeasance. Housing these two
divergent responsibilities in one office merely facilitates a
dereliction of duty.
I propose an amendment to the Restructuring Directive that
would require Member States to provide for the appointment of a
court fiduciary to investigate malfeasance and other wrongs
committed by a debtor’s management or other insiders. The
protocol for appointment would diverge from U.S. bankruptcy law
because the mandatory language of § 1104(c) coupled with a
relatively low threshold for appointment has removed the
judiciary’s discretion in a way that undermines the restructuring
process. Instead, I propose a provision to authorize courts to
appoint a fiduciary to investigate fraud, dishonesty, incompetence,
misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity involving a debtor’s
directors of a corporation facing a likelihood of insolvency. Article 18 provides that
“Member States shall lay down rules to ensure that, where there is a likelihood of
insolvency, directors have the following obligations: (a) to take immediate steps to
minimize the loss for creditors, workers, shareholders and other stakeholders; (b)
to have due regard to the interests of creditors and other stakeholders; (c) to take
reasonable steps to avoid insolvency; (d) to avoid deliberate or grossly negligent
conduct that threatens the viability of business.” Id. at art. 18. Article 18 helps
address the governance mismatch, but there is still a potential enforcement and
deterrence gap in the EU.
311
Article 5 indicates that Member States should mandate the appointment of
a restructuring practitioner only where (i) “the debtor is granted a general stay of
individual enforcement actions . . . [or (ii)] the restructuring plan needs to be
confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority by means of a cross-class cramdown.” Id. at art. 5.
312 See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 256-58. Note that some
Member States do instruct restructuring practitioners to consider causes of the
debtor’s financial collapse (e.g., Italy). See id. at 257.
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management if the appointment is in the interests of creditors, other
key stakeholders, or a government body. This provision would
diverge from U.S. bankruptcy law by removing the $5 Million
Threshold and authorizing an appointment if the interests of any
prominent stakeholder group would be served by the
appointment. 313 The court would determine the scope of the
examiner’s investigation and the allocation of funds and resources.
As a corollary to this provision, the EU should also encourage
Member States to mandate aggressive action if an examiner
identifies significant misconduct. I propose an amendment to the
Restructuring Directive that mandates the appointment of an RP—
assuming one has not already been appointed—to assume full
management of a debtor if an appointed court fiduciary determines
that the debtor’s former or current management team or insiders has
committed fraud or other significant malfeasance. A court may
decline the appointment if (i) in the event a new management team
has been appointed, this new team can establish that it has not been
involved in the misdeeds identified by the examiner or otherwise
influenced by the parties responsible for them; or (ii) displacement
of management would be against the interests of prominent
stakeholder groups.
These new provisions would create disincentives for directors,
officers, or insiders to attempt to forum shop in order to escape civil
or criminal liability.
ii.

Article 33 and the Refusal to Recognize Judgements

In truly egregious situations involving abusive or fraudulent
forum shopping that a court fails to regulate, Article 33 of the Recast
EIR allows other Member States to “refuse to recognize insolvency
proceedings opened in another Member State or to enforce
judgement handed down in the context of such proceedings where
the effects of such recognition or enforcement would be manifestly
contrary to that State’s public policy.”314 This threat is yet another
check on abusive or fraudulent forum shopping. Insiders wishing
313
11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) states that an appointment should be undertaken if all
prominent stakeholder groups benefit from the appointment.
314 See Recast EIR, supra note 122, art. 33.
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to engage in tourism to escape criminal or civil discipline for
corporate malfeasance run the risk of undertaking a long and
arduous process only to witness hard-fought relief secured in the
main proceeding disregarded by other courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Divergent substantive restructuring laws and jurists unfamiliar
with guiding reorganization cases are two intractable problems
embedded in the EU’s restructuring framework. The result is a
system that is plagued by uncertainty and disparate treatment,
suppressing creditor recoveries and undermining capital markets.
This Article casts a new light on these problems. Though often
vilified, bankruptcy tourism is a practice with uncertain effects.
Nevertheless, the current regulatory environment in the EU
aggressively restricts the practice. I argue that by doing so the EU is
undermining its key economic policy objectives. In fact, controlled
bankruptcy tourism—the kind apparent in the United States—
would help create judicial hubs of optimal law and experienced
jurists. This assessment may appear to be overly optimistic, but this
phenomenon has animated the U.S. bankruptcy system over the last
thirty years. In fact, tourism’s overall benefits may actually be
amplified in the EU. To that end, this Article proposes amendments
to EU Restructuring Law that will facilitate controlled tourism while
minimizing negative externalities that could destabilize the
restructuring system.
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